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285 
 THE END OF THE WAR ON DRUGS, 
THE PEACE DIVIDEND AND THE 





The War on Drugs profoundly eroded the Fourth Amendment.
1
 D.C. 
Circuit Court of Appeals Judge Harry T. Edwards summed it up in the 
midst of the War when he expressed his “growing concern about the degree 
to which individual rights and liberties appear to be falling victim to the 
Government’s ‘War on Drugs.’”
2
 
Scholars have identified many areas where the Supreme Court cut back 
Fourth Amendment protections as part of the War on Drugs. For instance, 
the Court has treated the drug-detection dog sniff as “sui generis” and 
correspondingly refused to recognize such a sniff as a search at all, despite 
its clear purpose to detect evidence of criminal activity.
3
 Additionally, the 
Court has found that police do not engage in Fourth Amendment activity 
when they fly over a suspect’s property, even when that overflight allows 
officers to peer into areas within a home’s curtilage that the homeowner 
                                                                                                                 
 * Distinguished Professor of Law, University of the Pacific, McGeorge School of 
Law; University of Pennsylvania, J.D., 1974; Swarthmore College, B.A., 1969. I would like 
to thank my research assistants Joanne Gothard and Cameron Graber for their excellent help 
with this Article. 
 1. There is much to support the notion that the War on Drugs, in general, is largely 
responsible for the current state of search-and-seizure law. See, e.g., Susan F. Mandiberg, 
Marijuana Prohibition and the Shrinking of the Fourth Amendment, 43 MCGEORGE L. REV. 
23, 23–24 (2012); see also Thomas Regnier, The “Loyal Foot Soldier”: Can the Fourth 
Amendment Survive the Supreme Court’s War on Drugs?, 72 UMKC L. REV. 631, 649–64 
(2004); David Rudovsky, The Impact of the War on Drugs on Procedural Fairness and 
Racial Equality, 1994 U. CHI. LEGAL F. 237, 240; Diane-Michele Krasnow, To Stop the 
Scourge: The Supreme Court’s Approach to the War on Drugs, 19 AM. J. CRIM. L. 219, 221 
(1992); Christian J. Rowley, Note, Florida v. Bostick: The Fourth Amendment—Another 
Casualty of the War on Drugs, 1992 UTAH L. REV. 601, 603; Steven K. Bernstein, Note, 
Fourth Amendment—Using the Drug Courier Profile to Fight to War on Drugs, 80 J. CRIM. 
L. & CRIMINOLOGY 996, 1017 (1990); Steven Wisotsky, Crackdown: The Emerging ‘Drug 
Exception’ to the Bill of Rights, 38 HASTINGS L.J. 889, 890 (1987); Stephen A. Saltzburg, 
Another Victim of Illegal Narcotics: The Fourth Amendment (as Illustrated by the Open 
Fields Doctrine), 48 U. PITT. L. REV. 1, 2–3 (1986). 
 2. Hartness v. Bush, 919 F.2d 170, 174 (D.C. Cir. 1990) (Edwards, J., dissenting). 
 3. See, e.g., United States v. Place, 462 U.S. 696, 707 (1983). 
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sought to exclude from the public’s view.
4
 The Court has also upheld 
consent searches under circumstances that defy credibility, for example, 
where a defendant would be able to drive away without more than a traffic 
ticket, but consents to a search leading to evidence that puts him away for 
years in prison.
5
 At the height of the War on Drugs, the Court extended the 
scope of a vehicle search-incident-to-a-lawful arrest to the entire passenger 
compartment, including closed containers within the vehicle.
6
 While, for a 
time, the Court seemed ready to declare some traffic offenses so trivial that 
the Fourth Amendment prohibited a custodial arrest,
7
 the Court rejected 
such a rule.
8
 Oddly enough, the Court has held that the Fourth Amendment 
does not outlaw a custodial arrest even when an officer erroneously 
believes that he has authority to make that arrest.
9
 The Court’s 
unwillingness to allow a defendant to inquire into whether a traffic stop was 




The list goes on and on. Notice, however, the ability of the police to stop 
virtually anyone on the highway and to escalate the encounter into a search 
based on slim, if any, justification.
11
 Because citizens lack the ability to 
                                                                                                                 
 4. See, e.g., Florida v. Riley, 488 U.S. 445, 451–52 (1989); California v. Ciraolo, 476 
U.S. 207, 215 (1986). 
 5. See, e.g., Florida v. Jimeno, 500 U.S. 248, 249–50 (1991); see also Ohio v. 
Robinette, 519 U.S. 33, 35–36 (1996) (upholding consent search where driver was not even 
ticketed). 
 6. New York v. Belton, 453 U.S. 454, 460 (1981); see also Thornton v. United States, 
541 U.S. 615, 623–24 (2004) (extending the Belton search rule to situations where the 
arrestee is a “recent occupant” of a car). 
 7. See Gustafson v. Florida, 414 U.S. 260, 266–67 (1973) (Stewart, J., concurring) 
(“[A] persuasive claim might have been made . . . that the custodial arrest of the petitioner 
for a minor traffic offense violated his rights under the Fourth and Fourteenth 
Amendments.”); United States v. Robinson, 414 U.S. 218, 237–38, 238 n.2 (1973) (Powell, 
J., concurring) (describing the validity of custodial arrest for minor traffic violations as not 
“self-evident”). 
 8. See Atwater v. City of Lago Vista, 532 U.S. 318, 323 (2001) (upholding custodial 
arrest instigated by minor traffic violation without any other criminal evidence). 
 9. Virginia v. Moore, 553 U.S. 164, 178 (2008). 
 10. See Whren v. United States, 517 U.S. 806, 814–15 (1996).  
 11. See, e.g., Navarette v. California, 572 U.S. 393, 395 (2014) (upholding the 
reasonable suspicion required to pull a motorist over based solely on an anonymous 911 call 
that claimed a Ford pickup with a particular license number “[r]an the reporting party off the 
roadway”); see also K.K. Rebecca Lai et al., Assessing the Legality of Sandra Bland’s 
Arrest, N.Y. TIMES (July 22, 2015), https://www.nytimes.com/interactive/2015/07/20/us/ 
sandra-bland-arrest-death-videos-maps.html. 
https://digitalcommons.law.ou.edu/olr/vol73/iss2/4
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challenge a stop as pretextual, officers can base stops on racial profiling 
largely with impunity.
12
 In light of such an eroded Fourth Amendment, it is 
unsurprising that minority men represent a disproportionate number of drug 
defendants in the criminal justice system.
13
 
The emergence of a broad political consensus has helped bring a truce—
and perhaps an end to—the War on Drugs.
14
 Many states have reduced 
prison populations, often by changing policies concerning the incarceration 
of drug offenders.
15
 At the federal level, the First Step Act—an unusual 
                                                                                                                 
 12. Drivers subjected to pretextual stops may still raise Equal Protection claims. Whren, 
517 U.S. at 813. The Court’s Equal Protection jurisprudence coupled with Whren itself, 
however, leaves little hope that officers would be deterred in any way by the possibility of 
an Equal Protection suit, or that the drivers themselves will be vindicated. See Herring v. 
United States, 555 U.S. 135, 153 (2009) (Ginsburg, J., dissenting) (“The exclusionary rule, it 
bears emphasis, is often the only remedy effective to redress a Fourth Amendment 
violation.”) (citations omitted); see also David O. Markus, Whren v. United States: A 
Pretext to Subvert the Fourth Amendment, 14 HARV. BLACKLETTER L.J. 91, 104–06 (1998). 
 13. See Michael Vitiello, Marijuana Legalization, Racial Disparity, and the Hope for 
Reform, 23 LEWIS & CLARK L. REV. 789, 790 (2019); Douglas A. Berman, Reminders of 
Realities of Marijuana Arrest Rates, L. PROFESSOR BLOGS NETWORK: MARIJUANA L., POL’Y 
& REFORM (July 8, 2018), https://lawprofessors.typepad.com/marijuana_law/2018/07/ 
reminders-of-realities-of-marijuana-arrest-rates.html; ASHLEY NELLIS, SENTENCING PROJECT, 
THE COLOR OF JUSTICE: RACIAL AND ETHICAL DISPARITY IN STATE PRISONS (2016), 
https://www.sentencingproject.org/wp-content/uploads/2016/06/The-Color-of-Justice-
Racial-and-Ethnic-Disparity-in-State-Prisons.pdf. See generally MICHELLE ALEXANDER, THE 
NEW JIM CROW: MASS INCARCERATION IN THE AGE OF COLORBLINDNESS (rev. ed. 2012). 
 14. See Christopher J. Coyne & Abigail R. Hall, Four Decades and Counting: The 
Continued Failure of the War on Drugs, CATO INST. (Apr. 12, 2017), https://www.cato.org/ 
publications/policy-analysis/four-decades-counting-continued-failure-war-drugs (“[Drug] 
prohibition is not only ineffective, but counterproductive, at achieving the goals of 
policymakers both domestically and abroad.”); see also Johann Hari, Op-Ed: The Old 
Global Consensus on the War on Drugs Is Crumbling, L.A. TIMES (Apr. 10, 2016, 5:00 
AM), https://www.latimes.com/opinion/op-ed/la-oe-0410-hari-un-drug-rebellion-20160410-
story.html; America’s New Drug Policy Landscape, PEW RES. CTR. (Apr. 2, 2014), 
https://www.people-press.org/2014/04/02/americas-new-drug-policy-landscape/ (providing a 
public opinion polling showing, inter alia, two-thirds of Americans favor treatment over 
incarceration for non-violent drug offenses). 
 15. See DENNIS SCHRANTZ, STEPHEN T. DEBOR & MARC MAUER, SENTENCING PROJECT, 
DECARCERATION STRATEGIES: HOW 5 STATES ACHIEVED SUBSTANTIAL PRISON POPULATION 
REDUCTIONS (2018), https://www.sentencingproject.org/wp-content/uploads/2018/09/ 
Decarceration-Strategies.pdf. 
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moment of bipartisanship in a dysfunctional Congress
16
—signals 
exhaustion with the War. This shifting attitude may be driving real change, 
as one Pew Research Center report suggests that racial disparity in our 
prison systems has lessened in recent years.
17
 
If the War is over or ending, will the Court breathe life back into the 
Fourth Amendment? Judge Edwards raised the question in 1990, when he 
stated, “[W]hen the war is over, we find that departures from constitutional 
norms, legitimized by the courts, have lasting and wide-ranging effects. 
Constitutional principles, once abandoned, are not easily reclaimed.”
18
 This 
article explores the future of Fourth Amendment jurisprudence in the face 
of the waning war. 
Indeed, we may be reclaiming Fourth Amendment protections. In 2009, 
the Court examined the scope of a vehicle search based on a lawful arrest.
19
 
Arizona v. Gant revived a more careful analysis, tying the scope of 
legitimate police conduct to the underlying rationale that made such 
conduct reasonable within the meaning of the Fourth Amendment.
20
 Three 
years later, the Supreme Court confronted how the Fourth Amendment 
should apply in an era of expanded data collection.
21
 In a series of recent 
cases, the Court seems ready to articulate a new paradigm in cases 
                                                                                                                 
 16. Jamiles Lartey, Trump Signs Bipartisan Criminal Justice Overhaul First Step Act 
into Law, GUARDIAN (Dec. 21, 2018, 7:12 PM GMT), https://www.theguardian.com/us-
news/2018/dec/21/trump-prison-reform-first-step-act-signed-law. 
 17. See John Gramlich, The Gap Between the Number of Blacks and Whites in Prison Is 
Shrinking, PEW RES. CTR. (Apr. 30, 2019), https://www.pewresearch.org/fact-tank/2019/04/ 
30/shrinking-gap-between-number-of-blacks-and-whites-in-prison/ (“[A] significant decline 
in the number of black prisoners has steadily narrowed the gap over the past decade, 
according to new data from the Bureau of Justice Statistics.”). 
 18. Hartness v. Bush, 919 F.2d 170, 175 (D.C. Cir. 1990) (Edwards, J., dissenting). 
 19. See Arizona v. Gant, 556 U.S. 332, 338 (2009). 
 20. See id. at 351 (“Police may search a vehicle incident to [lawful arrest] only if the 
arrestee is in reaching distance of the passenger compartment at the time of the search or it is 
reasonable to believe the vehicle contains evidence of the offense of arrest. When these 
justifications are absent, a search of an arrestee’s vehicle will be unreasonable unless police 
obtain a warrant or show that another exception to the warrant requirement applies.”). 
 21. See United States v. Jones, 565 U.S. 400, 402 (2012) (analyzing “whether the 
attachment of a Global–Positioning–System (GPS) tracking device to an individual’s 
vehicle, and subsequent use of that device to monitor the vehicle’s movements on public 
streets, constitutes a search or seizure within the meaning of the Fourth Amendment”). See 
generally Michael Vitiello, Katz v. United States: Back to the Future?, 52 U. RICH. L. REV. 
425 (2018). 
https://digitalcommons.law.ou.edu/olr/vol73/iss2/4





 Those cases suggest the Court’s willingness to 
rethink its Fourth Amendment jurisprudence.
23
 
This article focuses on some specific Fourth Amendment issues that have 
arisen in states where voters have legalized marijuana for medical and/or 
recreational use. Since California adopted its medical marijuana law, its 
courts have shown little interest in extending Fourth Amendment 
protection, even in situations where suspects have medical marijuana 
authorization.
24
 Most courts, even in states that legalized marijuana for 
medical use, concluded that an officer observing a suspect in possession of 
marijuana had probable cause to arrest or to search.
25
 Courts may be ready 
to rethink that bright-line rule.
26
 
Other states’ courts have shown a willingness either to expand Fourth 
Amendment protection or to rely on state constitutional provisions to 
counter the Supreme Court’s Fourth Amendment case law.
27
 For example, 
the New Mexico and Hawaii State Supreme Courts have read the United 
States Supreme Court’s overflight case law narrowly to protect defendants 
growing marijuana in those states.
28
 Similarly, the Colorado Supreme Court 
                                                                                                                 
 22. See, e.g., Carpenter v. United States, 138 S. Ct. 2206, 2216 (2018) (“As Justice 
Brandeis explained in his famous dissent, the Court is obligated—as ‘[s]ubtler and more far-
reaching means of invading privacy have become available to the Government’—to ensure 
that the ‘progress of science’ does not erode Fourth Amendment protections.” (quoting 
Olmstead v. United States, 277 U.S. 438, 473–74 (1928) (Brandeis, J., dissenting))); Riley v. 
California, 573 U.S. 373, 401 (2014) (“Our holding, of course, is not that the information on 
a cell phone is immune from search; it is instead that a warrant is generally required before 
such a search, even when a cell phone is seized incident to arrest.”); Jones, 565 U.S. at 411 
(“What we apply is an 18th-century guarantee against unreasonable searches, which we 
believe must provide at a minimum the degree of protection it afforded when it was 
adopted.”). See generally John R. Kroger, The Fourth Amendment in the Age of Trump and 
Roberts, 55 GONZ. L. REV. 1 (2019); Andrew Guthrie Ferguson, The Smart Fourth 
Amendment, 102 CORNELL L. REV. 547 (2017). 
 23. When approaching twenty-first-century technologies, the Court recognized that 
circumstances now necessitate a new way to “apply the Fourth Amendment to a new 
phenomenon.” Carpenter, 138 S. Ct. at 2216. 
 24. See infra Part IV. 
 25. See infra Part IV. 
 26. See infra Part IV. 
 27. See infra Part IV. 
 28. See State v. Davis, 360 P.3d 1161, 1164, 1173 (N.M. 2015) (holding that 
warrantless aerial surveillance of a greenhouse via helicopter, involving prolonged hovering 
at a height of fifty feet while kicking up dust and debris, was an unconstitutional search); see 
also State v. Quiday, 405 P.3d 552, 558–59 (Haw. 2017) (holding that an individual has a 
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recently rejected the Supreme Court’s dog-sniff jurisprudence in favor of 
stronger Fourth Amendment protections.
29
  
Are these cases an aberration or a trend? This Article argues that we are 
at the threshold of an expanded Fourth Amendment.
30
 Judge Edwards 
suggested that reclaiming constitutional principles is not easy;
31
 I do not 
pretend that it is. However, changing perceptions about the War on Drugs 




Part II reviews some of the areas where the War on Drugs helped shrink 
the Fourth Amendment.
33
 Part III briefly discusses some of the cases, 
including the recent technology cases, which may point towards the Court’s 
willingness to rethink its Fourth Amendment case law.
34
 Part IV turns to 
developments in state courts, with a particular focus on states that have 
legalized medical and/or recreational marijuana.
35
 At least tentatively, this 
Article argues that recent cases demonstrate exhaustion with the War on 
Drugs and a trend towards a new, more invigorated Fourth Amendment.
36
  
II. The Vanishing Fourth Amendment 
A. The Warren Court 
Students of constitutional criminal procedure are familiar with the 
Warren Court’s criminal procedural revolution, effectively beginning with 
Mapp v. Ohio in 1961, and ending with the end of Chief Justice Warren’s 
                                                                                                                 
reasonable expectation of privacy from governmental aerial surveillance of his or her 
curtilage and residence). 
 29. People v. McKnight, 446 P.3d 397, 414 (Colo. 2019) (holding that a sniff from a 
dog trained to detect marijuana is a search requiring suspicion of criminal activity and a 
warrant). 
 30. See infra Part IV. 
 31. See Hartness v. Bush, 919 F.2d 170, 175 (D.C. Cir. 1990) (Edwards, J., dissenting) 
(“Constitutional principles, once abandoned, are not easily reclaimed.”). 
 32. See generally Don Stemen, Beyond the War: The Evolving Nature of the U.S. 
Approach to Drugs, 11 HARV. L. & POL’Y REV. 375 (2017) (examining the context of the 
War on Drugs, shifts in policy and public perception, and how enforcement laws and 
policies changed through the 1970s up to the 2010s). 
 33. See infra Part II.  
 34. See infra Part III. 
 35. See infra Part IV. 
 36. See infra Part IV. 
https://digitalcommons.law.ou.edu/olr/vol73/iss2/4
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tenure on the bench in 1969.
37
 Mapp held that the exclusionary rule is the 
constitutionally mandated remedy for Fourth Amendment violations.
38
 Over 
the next eight years, the Court found that virtually all individual protections 
in the Bill of Rights applied to the states as well as the federal 
government.
39
 Similarly, the Warren Court largely expanded the scope of 
the Fourth Amendment during that same period.
40
 
Probable cause and warrant requirements were the centerpiece of the 
Warren Court’s Fourth Amendment jurisprudence. Though the Court 
recognized some notable exceptions to the probable cause warrant 
protection, it required any exception to be “strictly tied to and justified 
by”
41
 the justifications that made such an exception reasonable. One scholar 
labeled this approach as the “principle of particular justification.”
42
 
This approach has an obvious advantage: it provides a coherent 
explanation for exactly what makes a police officer’s conduct reasonable. 
Thus, in Chimel v. California, the Court narrowed a search-incident-to-a-
lawful-arrest to the area within the arrestee’s “immediate control.”
43
 
Supreme Court precedent had previously allowed officers making an in-
home arrest to search the arrestee’s home without securing a warrant and 
without having probable cause to search for evidence.
44
 The Chimel Court 
feared pretextual arrests in a suspect’s home would allow officers to 
circumvent the probable cause and search warrant requirements.
45
 
                                                                                                                 
 37. 367 U.S. 643 (1961); see Jerold H. Israel, Selective Incorporation: Revisited, 71 
GEO. L.J. 253, 253 (1982) (observing that the Warren Court “expanded the reach of 
constitutional regulation of criminal procedure many times beyond that which had been 
attained through all of the Court’s constitutional rulings over the previous 170 years”). 
 38. See Mapp, 367 U.S. at 655 (“[A]ll evidence obtained by searches and seizures in 
violation of the Constitution is, by that same authority, inadmissible in a state court.”). 
 39. Israel, supra note 37, at 253. 
 40. See, e.g., Katz v. United States, 389 U.S. 347, 351, 353 (1967) (holding, famously, 
“the Fourth Amendment protects people, not places” and expanding the Fourth 
Amendment’s protection beyond its traditional realm of only physically trespassory police 
action to include any government violation of a subjective expectation of privacy that 
society is prepared to recognize as objectively reasonable). 
 41. Terry v. Ohio, 392 U.S. 1, 19 (1968) (citations omitted). 
 42. James B. White, The Fourth Amendment as a Way of Talking About People: A Study 
of Robinson and Matlock, 1974 SUP. CT. REV. 165, 190. 
 43. 395 U.S. 752, 763–64 (1969). 
 44. See Harris v. United States, 331 U.S. 145, 151–52 (1947) (sustaining a warrantless 
search through a four-room apartment as “incident to arrest”). 
 45. See 395 U.S. at 767 (“The petitioner correctly points out that one result of [cases not 
limiting searches to the ‘grabbing area’] is to give law enforcement officials the opportunity 
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Searching within the suspect’s “grabbing area” is reasonable because the 
search-incident doctrine is premised on the need to protect the arresting 
officer and to prevent destruction of evidence.
46
 Searching beyond that area, 
therefore, exceeds the specific justifications underlying the exception to the 
probable cause warrant requirement.
47
 
The Warren Court also redefined the meaning of a Fourth Amendment 
“search” to reflect the development of modern technology. In Katz v. 
United States, FBI agents had attached a listening device to a telephone 
booth that a gambler was using to transmit bets.
48
 Consistent with Supreme 
Court precedent, the agents did not use a listening device that physically 
penetrated the phone booth.
49
 As framed in the grant of certiorari, the Court 
was to resolve whether a phone booth is a constitutionally protected area; if 
so, the Court would then determine whether physical penetration of that 
area is required to render a search and seizure violative of the Fourth 
Amendment.
50
 The Court rejected that proposed formulation and, implicitly 
rejecting property concepts as the prevailing Fourth Amendment model, 
tied the definition of a “search” to an individual’s expectation of privacy.
51
 
These cases are illustrative of the Warren Court’s bold—though some 
would argue foolhardy—efforts to invigorate defendants’ procedural 
protections. Often, racial bias motivated the Court.
52
 Notable cases involved 




                                                                                                                 
to engage in searches not justified by probable cause, by the simple expedient of arranging to 
arrest suspects at home rather than elsewhere.”). 
 46. Id. at 762–63 (“[O]therwise, the officer’s safety might well be endangered, and the 
arrest itself frustrated.”). 
 47. Id. at 763 (“There is no comparable justification, however, for routinely searching 
any room other than that in which an arrest occurs—or, for that matter, for searching through 
all the desk drawers or other closed or concealed areas in that room itself.”). 
 48. 389 U.S. 347, 348 (1967). 
 49. Id.; see Silverman v. United States, 365 U.S. 505, 511 (1961); see also Goldman v. 
United States, 316 U.S. 129, 134–35 (1942). 
 50. Katz v. United States, 386 U.S. 954, 954–55 (1967). 
 51. Katz, 389 U.S. at 350–51. 
 52. See generally FRED P. GRAHAM, THE SELF-INFLICTED WOUND (1970). 
 53. See, e.g., Miranda v. Arizona, 384 U.S. 436, 491–92 (1966) (determining that 
Ernesto Miranda’s constitutional rights were violated) (“[I]t is clear that Miranda was not in 
any way apprised of his right to consult with an attorney and to have one present during the 
interrogation, nor was his right not to be compelled to incriminate himself effectively 
protected in any other manner. Without these warnings the statements were inadmissible.”). 
https://digitalcommons.law.ou.edu/olr/vol73/iss2/4
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B. The Nixon-Burger Court  
Also familiar history for students of constitutional criminal procedure, 
the Warren Court’s expansive interpretations of the Bill of Rights resulted 
in a backlash.
54
 The Court’s decision in Miranda v. Arizona produced calls 
to impeach Earl Warren.
55
 Presidential candidates George Wallace and 
Richard Nixon made law-and-order a central campaign issue.
56
 They did so 
at a time when crime rates were on the rise.
57
 During their campaigns, 
Nixon and Wallace unfairly created links in the public’s consciousness 




 Once he was in office, President Nixon made four appointments to the 
Court within a two-year period.
59
 Nixon’s selections delivered on his law-
and-order campaign promise.
60
 For example, soon-to-be-appointed Chief 
Justice Warren Burger came to Nixon’s attention because of his prominent 
law-and-order stance.
61
 Critics have debated whether the Nixon-Burger 
                                                                                                                 
 54. See generally GRAHAM, supra note 52. 
 55. See MICHAEL J. GRAETZ & LINDA GREENHOUSE, THE BURGER COURT AND THE RISE 
OF THE JUDICIAL RIGHT 2–3 (2016) (including a photograph of an “IMPEACH EARL 
WARREN” billboard along a California highway). 
 56. William G. Ross, The Supreme Court as an Issue in Presidential Campaigns, 37 J. 
SUP. CT. HIST. 322, 331–32 (2012); see also KEVIN J. MCMAHON, NIXON’S COURT: HIS 
CHALLENGE TO JUDICIAL LIBERALISM AND ITS POLITICAL CONSEQUENCES 37–62 (2011). 
 57. See GRAHAM, supra note 52, at 299 (detailing increases in frequency of criminal 
activity during this period); see also GRAETZ & GREENHOUSE, supra note 55, at 12. 
 58. See LIVA BAKER, MIRANDA: CRIME, LAW AND POLITICS 224 (1st ed. 1983) (stating 
that, during Nixon’s speech accepting the Republican presidential nomination, he 
“promise[d] . . . voters that night that ‘the wave of crime is not going to be the wave of the 
future in the United States of America,’ [and] that the restoration of law and order would be 
a linchpin of his administration”); see also MCMAHON, supra note 56, at 41–43 (explaining 
that in Wallace’s standard stump speech, he “linked the rise in crime to the Court by telling 
those assembled, ‘If you walk out of this hotel tonight and someone knocks you on the head, 
he’ll be out of jail before you’re out of the hospital, and on Monday morning they’ll try the 
policeman instead of the criminal.’”). 
 59. Justices 1789 to Present, SUP. CT. U.S., https://www.supremecourt.gov/about/ 
members_text.aspx (last visited Sept. 12, 2020). 
 60. EARL M. MALTZ, THE COMING OF THE NIXON COURT: THE 1972 TERM AND THE 
TRANSFORMATION OF CONSTITUTIONAL LAW 2 (2016). 
 61. MCMAHON, supra note 56, at 114. 
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Court effectuated a counter-revolution.
62
 Many of the Court’s decisions 
either cabined Warren Court precedent or refused to extend its case law.  
Cases like United States v. Robinson shifted the new majority’s approach 
to Fourth Amendment questions in two respects.
63
 Crucially, Robinson 
moved away from the Warren Court’s “principle of particular 
justification.”
64
 It also signaled the Burger Court’s preference for bright-
line rules.  
In Robinson, the officer arrested the defendant for driving on a 
suspended license and acknowledged that he did not fear for his safety.
65
 
The D.C. Circuit Court found the search of the defendant’s crumpled 
cigarette packet containing heroin was illegal because it exceeded the 
underlying justification for a search-incident-to-a-lawful arrest.
66
 The 
Burger Court rejected such a narrowly tailored reading of the law.
67
 Instead, 
it found reasonable a general rule governing custodial arrests.
68
 The opinion 
reflected a change in the framework of analysis, away from the Warren 
Court’s major premise of probable cause and warrants with narrow 
exceptions.
69
 The Burger Court saw the reasonableness prong of the Fourth 
Amendment as its major premise, not probable cause and warrants.
70
 
                                                                                                                 
 62. See, e.g., Vincent Blasi, Preface to THE BURGER COURT: THE COUNTER-
REVOLUTION THAT WASN’T xi, xii (Vincent Blasi ed., 1983) (“The story of the Burger Court 
to date, whatever else it might be, is not a tale of a conservative counter-revolution, at least 
not one of epic proportions or obvious import.”). 
 63. 414 U.S. 218 (1973). 
 64. See id. at 236 (“Since it is the fact of custodial arrest which gives rise to the 
authority to search, it is of no moment that [the officer] did not indicate any subjective fear 
of the respondent or that he did not himself suspect that respondent was armed.”). 
 65. Id. at 221–22, 236. 
 66. United States v. Robinson, 471 F.2d 1082, 1103–04 (D.C. Cir. 1972). 
 67. See Robinson, 414 U.S. at 235 (“[O]ur more fundamental disagreement with the 
Court of Appeals arises from its suggestion that there must be litigated in each case the issue 
of whether or not there was present one of the reasons supporting the authority for a search 
of the person incident to the lawful arrest.”). 
 68. See id. (“A custodial arrest of a suspect based on probable cause is a reasonable 
intrusion under the Fourth Amendment; that intrusion being lawful, a search incident to the 
arrest requires no additional justification.”). 
 69. See id. at 226 (“Since [prior search-incident-to-a-lawful-arrest decisions] speak not 
simply in terms of an exception to the warrant requirement, but in terms of an affirmative 
authority to search, they clearly imply that such searches also meet the Fourth Amendment’s 
requirement of reasonableness.”). 
 70. See id. at 235; see also Silas J. Wasserstrom, The Court’s Turn Toward a General 
Reasonableness Interpretation of the Fourth Amendment, 27 AM. CRIM. L. REV. 119, 121–22 
(1989). 
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Additionally, Robinson emphasized the need for bright lines, an approach 
that was soon to dominate the Court’s Fourth Amendment analysis.
71
 
While the Burger Court demonstrated a general commitment to 
expanding police power and cutting back on Warren Court precedent, the 
liberal wing of the Court still achieved some successes. For example, the 
Court in Coolidge v. New Hampshire found unconstitutional a New 
Hampshire law that allowed the state’s attorney general, rather than a 
“neutral and detached magistrate,” to issue search warrants.
72
 In that case, 
the state attempted to argue exceptions to the warrant requirement.
73
 The 




The Court’s liberal wing similarly prevailed in United States v. 
Chadwick. There, the Supreme Court took up the government’s contention 
that, after Katz, only high privacy zones, like “homes, offices, and private 
communications, implicate interests which lie at the core of the Fourth 
Amendment” and therefore require warrants.
75
 Chadwick involved the 
warrantless search of a footlocker that federal agents had probable cause to 
believe contained a large quantity of marijuana.
76
 In the trial court, the 
government attempted to justify the warrantless search based on the 
“automobile exception” to the warrant requirement.
77
 Rather than pressing 
that same point in the Supreme Court, the government instead argued that 
police must secure warrants only when they seek to search in a home or 
office.
78
 In a 7–2 decision, Chief Justice Burger rejected that position out of 
                                                                                                                 
 71. See Robinson, 414 U.S. at 235 (“The authority to search the person incident to a 
lawful custodial arrest, while based upon the need to disarm and to discover evidence, does 
not depend on what a court may later decide was the probability in a particular arrest 
situation that weapons or evidence would in fact be found upon the person of the suspect. A 
custodial arrest of a suspect based on probable cause is a reasonable intrusion under the 
Fourth Amendment; that intrusion being lawful, a search incident to the arrest requires no 
additional justification.”). 
 72. 403 U.S. 443, 447, 449 (1971). 
 73. Id. at 445, 453–73. 
 74. See id. at 456, 458, 464 (rejecting the state’s arguments that (1) the search and 
seizure were “‘incident’ to a valid arrest,” (2) “the police may make a warrantless search of 
an automobile whenever they have probable cause to do so,” and (3) “the car itself was an 
‘instrumentality of the crime’”). 
 75. United States v. Chadwick, 433 U.S. 1, 7 (1977). 
 76. Id. at 3–4. 
 77. Id. at 5. 
 78. Id. at 7. 
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C. Ronald Reagan and the Real War on Drugs 
Many more major changes were on the horizon. Despite claiming to 
launch a War on Drugs, Nixon was less invested in that war than was 
Ronald Reagan.
80
 Nixon was instrumental in the passage of the Controlled 
Substances Act, which resulted in the classification of marijuana, LSD, and 
other drugs as Schedule I.
81
 Despite that legislation, punishments for drug 
offenses were not especially severe during President Nixon’s tenure.
82
 
President Reagan was a far more committed anti-drug warrior.
83
 His 
administration led efforts to increase penalties for drug offenses, including 
marijuana offenses, and to expand police efforts to target drug offenders.
84
 
Drug defendants challenged many of those aggressive police practices.
85
 
                                                                                                                 
 79. See id. at 7, 11 (“There being no exigency, it was unreasonable for the Government 
to conduct this search without the safeguards a judicial warrant provides.”). 
 80. See Andrew B. Whitford & Jeff Yates, Policy Signals and Executive Governance: 
Presidential Rhetoric in the War on Drugs, 65 J. POL. 995, 998 (2003) (“Nixon was the first 
president to use the phrase ‘war on drugs[,]’ . . . but the recent War on Drugs began as a part 
of Ronald Reagan’s crime control strategy.”); see also JOHN HUDAK, MARIJUANA 59–84 
(2016) (“Ronald Reagan steered America back on course to a full-fledged War on Drugs.”). 
 81. Comprehensive Drug Abuse Prevention and Control Act of 1970, Pub. L. No. 91-
513, 84 Stat. 1236 (codified as amended in 21 U.S.C. §§ 801, 951 (2018)). 
 82. See Stemen, supra note 32, at 397–400 (observing a decrease in average length of 
state-imposed sentences and an increase in federally-imposed sentences). 
 83. Addressing the nation in 1986, President Reagan affirmed his commitment to 
combating drug use: “From the beginning of our administration, we’ve taken strong steps to 
do something about this horror. . . . Thirty-seven Federal agencies are working together in a 
vigorous national effort, and by next year our spending levels for drug law enforcement will 
have more than tripled from its 1981 levels.” Address to the Nation on the Campaign 
Against Drug Abuse, September 14, 1986, RONALD REAGAN PRESIDENTIAL LIBR. & MUSEUM, 
https://www.reaganlibrary.gov/research/speeches/091486a (last visited Sept. 29, 2020). 
 84. Editors, War on Drugs, HIST. (Dec. 17, 2019), https://www.history.com/topics/ 
crime/the-war-on-drugs. See generally JOHANN HARI, CHASING THE SCREAM: THE FIRST AND 
LAST DAYS OF THE WAR ON DRUGS (2015); THOMAS C. ROWE, FEDERAL NARCOTICS LAWS 
AND THE WAR ON DRUGS: MONEY DOWN A RAT HOLE (Routledge 2012) (2006); DAN BAUM, 
SMOKE AND MIRRORS: THE WAR ON DRUGS AND THE POLITICS OF FAILURE (1996). 
 85. Cf. Sandra Bass, Policing Space, Policing Race: Social Control Imperatives and 
Police Discretionary Decisions, 28 SOC. JUST. 156, 164–72 (2001) (observing the disparate 
impact of the War on Drugs on African Americans and the efforts taken to challenge drug 
policies). 
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Unlike its decisions during the 1970s, the Supreme Court now largely 
upheld aggressive police practices.
86
 In doing so, it shrank the Fourth 
Amendment. Many, if not most, of the Fourth Amendment cases during the 
period from the 1980s into the 2000s involved defendants arrested for drug 
activity.
87
 The cases discussed below represent significant Fourth 
Amendment decisions, but this Article does not pretend to canvass all the 
areas where the Court eroded the Fourth Amendment.
88
 
1. Drug-Sniffing Dogs  
Police have relied on dogs for centuries because of their acute sense of 
smell.
89
 Using dogs for detection of drugs took hold in the 1970s and 
continues today.
90
 The process involves police exposing luggage or other 
items to trained dogs who then signal the presence of drugs.
91
 But do the 
police need any prior justification for this action? Framed in Fourth 
Amendment terms, is a dog-sniff a search? Obviously, a dog-sniff usually 
                                                                                                                 
 86. See, e.g., Graham v. Connor, 490 U.S. 386, 388 (1989) (establishing an “objective 
reasonableness” standard for claims that law enforcement officials have used excessive 
force); see also United States v. Hensley, 469 U.S. 221, 229 (1985) (affirming, unanimously, 
the application of Terry doctrine when an officer seeks to investigate a felony that has 
already been completed); Oliver v. United States, 466 U.S. 170, 173, 184 (1984) (upholding 
an officer’s search, nearly a mile past “no trespassing” signs into defendant’s property, that 
revealed marijuana as valid under the open fields doctrine); United States v. Leon, 468 U.S. 
897, 922 (1984) (establishing the “good faith” exception to the Fourth Amendment’s 
exclusionary rule). 
 87. See, e.g., Minnesota v. Dickerson, 508 U.S. 366, 376–77 (1993) (extending the 
“plain view” doctrine to uphold seizure of small lump of crack cocaine from defendant’s 
pocket); see also Florida v. Bostick, 501 U.S. 429, 439–40 (1991) (upholding random bus 
searches for drugs performed by multiple uniformed officers where a “reasonable person” 
would feel free to decline a search); United States v. Mendenhall, 446 U.S. 544, 548–49, 
559–60 (1980) (holding that a woman “freely and voluntarily” followed DEA agents into a 
small examination room and consented to a strip search that revealed two small packages of 
heroin in her underwear). 
 88. For an introduction to the beginning of the Court’s disassembly of the Fourth 
Amendment after the Warren Court years, see Silas J. Wasserstrom, The Incredible 
Shrinking Fourth Amendment, 21 AM. CRIM. L. REV. 257 (1984). 
 89. Florida v. Jardines, 569 U.S. 1, 23 (2013) (Alito, J., dissenting). 
 90. See id. at 15 (Kagan, J., concurring) (observing that the use of “drug-detection dogs 
actually go[es] back . . . only a few decades”). 
 91. See, e.g., United States v. Place, 462 U.S. 696, 699 (1983) (describing agents 
subjecting airline luggage to a “‘sniff test’ by a trained narcotics detection dog”). 
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does not require a physical trespass.
92
 However, the Warren Court shifted 
the focus of the Fourth Amendment’s inquiry from property concepts to 
privacy expectations in Katz,
93
 and a dog-sniff certainly reveals information 
that a person seeks to keep private. 
The Court answered the question in United States v. Place.
94
 There, the 
police had detained the defendant’s luggage for an extensive period so 
officers could expose his luggage to a drug-sniffing dog.
95
 The Court found 
that the detention was an unlawful seizure.
96
 In dicta, however, the Court 
resolved the lingering Katz question about dogs: a dog-sniff is “sui 
generis,” revealing only the presence or absence of contraband.
97
 According 
to Justice O’Connor, an individual has a limited expectation of privacy in 
the possession of contraband.
98
 
The Court reaffirmed and extended Place in Illinois v. Caballes.
99
 There, 
officers stopped individuals for traffic offenses and exposed the vehicles to 
drug-sniffing dogs.
100
 The Court held that if the police did not detain any 
individual beyond the time needed to cite the driver, such practices did not 
violate the Fourth Amendment.
101
 
As developed below, cases like Place and Caballes seemed premised on 
the Justices’ belief in the near-infallibility of drug-sniffing dogs.
102
 After 
those two cases, the police had a powerful tool in their efforts against drug 
trafficking. But dogs’ noses would hardly be the only tools that the Court 
would endorse. 
  
                                                                                                                 
 92. The maneuver performed by trained detection dogs is sometimes referred to as a 
“free air sniff.” Florida v. Harris, 568 U.S. 237, 240 (2013). 
 93. See Katz v. United States, 389 U.S. at 347, 351 (1967) (“For the Fourth Amendment 
protects people, not places.”). 
 94. 462 U.S. 696. 
 95. See id. at 699. 
 96. Id. at 710. 
 97. See id. at 707 (explaining investigative procedures employed in a dog sniff are 
unique in that “no other investigative procedure . . . is so limited both in the manner in which 
the information is obtained and in the content of the information revealed by the 
procedure”). 
 98. Id. 
 99. 543 U.S. 405 (2005). 
 100. See id. at 406. 
 101. Id. at 407–08. 
 102. See infra Section IV.B. 
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2. Overflight Cases 
When the Court’s Fourth Amendment case law relied almost exclusively 
on property concepts, the Supreme Court held that officers who entered an 
owner’s open fields did not violate the Fourth Amendment.
103
 After Katz, 
lower courts struggled to determine whether defendants might have a 




The facts in many post-Katz cases suggest that an “open field” is hardly a 
simple concept. Imagine rural land, far from major roadways or population 
centers, fenced, and marked with NO TRESPASSING signs. Might one 
have a reasonable expectation of privacy in such a place? One would have 
thought that the answer to be, “It depends.” Not so, according to the 
Supreme Court in Oliver v. United States.
105
 Justice Powell, writing for the 
Court, seemed to believe that a bright line existed between open fields (no 
reasonable expectation of privacy) and the curtilage of a house (reasonable 
expectation of privacy).
106
 Thus, under this view, officers would only be 
conducting a Fourth Amendment search if they sought to collect 
information about activities within the curtilage. Whatever one might think 
about the Court’s finding that individuals cannot claim privacy in land 
outside the curtilage, Justice Powell was surprised to learn that owners and 




                                                                                                                 
 103. Hester v. United States, 265 U.S. 57, 58–59 (1924). 
 104. See, e.g., United States v. Miller, 589 F.2d 1117, 1133–34 (1st Cir. 1978) (holding 
appellant did not have a reasonable expectation of privacy in private land that “was not 
posted; [had] no fence or chain to impede visitors; [and was approached] by the officers . . . 
openly in broad daylight”); see also Patler v. Slayton, 503 F.2d 472, 478 (4th Cir. 1974) 
(“Appellants’ reasonable expectations of privacy—while extending to their dwellings and 
the immediate area around them and even to the area occupied by outbuildings such as the 
barns in question . . .—cannot, in light of Hester, be said to include the ‘open fields’ around 
the barn.” (quoting United States v. Brown, 487 F.2d 208, 210 (4th Cir. 1983) (alterations in 
original))). 
 105. 466 U.S. 170, 179 (1984) (“[T]he asserted expectation of privacy in open fields is 
not an expectation that ‘society recognizes as reasonable.’”). 
 106. See id. at 178–79. 
 107. Compare id. at 178 (“[A]n individual may not legitimately demand privacy for 
activities conducted out of doors in fields, except in the area immediately surrounding the 
home.”), with California v. Ciraolo, 476 U.S. 207, 219 (1986) (Powell, J., dissenting) 
(arguing that the Court’s “conclusory rejection of respondent’s expectation of privacy in the 
yard of his residence . . . represents a turning away from the principles that have guided our 
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In California v. Ciraolo, Santa Clara Police sought to corroborate a tip 
that the defendant was growing marijuana in his backyard, an area fenced in 
too well to allow officers to peer in.
108
 Instead, officers used a private plane 
to fly over the defendant’s backyard, where they observed marijuana.
109
 A 
5–4 majority held that aerial surveillance in this case did not amount to a 
search.
110
 Justice Powell dissented, raising concerns that technological 
advances threatened the erosion of privacy of the home.
111
  
The police conduct in Florida v. Riley was even more intrusive.
112
 There, 
the defendant took substantial steps to exclude the public from his 
property.
113
 As summarized by Justice White’s plurality opinion: 
Respondent Riley lived in a mobile home located on five acres 
of rural property. A greenhouse was located 10 to 20 feet behind 
the mobile home. Two sides of the greenhouse were enclosed. 
The other two sides were not enclosed but the contents of the 
greenhouse were obscured from view from surrounding property 
by trees, shrubs, and the mobile home. The greenhouse was 
covered by corrugated roofing panels, some translucent and 
some opaque. At the time relevant to this case, two of the panels, 
amounting to approximately 10% of the roof area, were missing. 
A wire fence surrounded the mobile home and the greenhouse, 
and the property was posted with a “DO NOT ENTER” sign.
114 
To corroborate a tip, officers used a helicopter.
115
 Flying 400 feet above the 
property, “[w]ith his naked eye, [an officer] was able to see through the 
openings in the roof and one or more of the open sides of the greenhouse 
and to identify what he thought was marijuana growing in the structure.”
116
 
                                                                                                                 
Fourth Amendment inquiry” and is “curiously at odds with its purported reaffirmation of the 
curtilage doctrine”). 
 108. 476 U.S. at 209. 
 109. Id. 
 110. See id. at 213–14 (“Any member of the public flying in this airspace who glanced 
down could have seen everything that these officers observed. On this record, we readily 
conclude that respondent’s expectation that his garden was protected from such observation 
is unreasonable and is not an expectation that society is prepared to honor.”). 
 111. Id. at 222–25 (Powell, J., dissenting). 
 112. 488 U.S. 445 (1989). 
 113. See id. at 448. 
 114. Id. 
 115. Id. 
 116. Id. 
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Although the majority divided on the relevant test to explain why, five 
justices found that the police conduct did not amount to a Fourth 
Amendment search.
117
 By 1989—the year of the Riley decision—Justice 
Kennedy had replaced Justice Powell.
118
 Given his dissent in Ciraolo, 
Justice Powell must have been even more shocked at the result in Riley.
119
  
One might ask, then, what a rural resident must do to maintain privacy. 
Read in context, Riley and Ciraolo gave police a powerful tool in the War 
on Drugs. In rural areas of California known for marijuana production, and 
elsewhere, individuals were under siege conditions.
120
 
3. Pretext Stops, Trivial Offenses, and Search-Incident-to-Lawful Arrest 
Many years ago, I presented the following hypothetical to my Criminal 
Procedure classes: 
 An officer was sitting in his patrol car. He was in a bad mood when he 
noticed a family heading off on vacation in a station wagon filled with 
luggage. Mom was driving, Dad was in the front seat, and two teenagers 
were in the backseat with their backpacks nearby. The officer realized that 
the driver was a woman whom he had tried to date, but who had not been 
interested in him. Out of sheer spite, or maybe even racial animus, the 
officer followed the vehicle until the driver sped slightly over the speed 
limit or made a lane change without signaling before doing so. I then asked 




                                                                                                                 
 117. Compare id. at 450 (“Because the sides and roof of his greenhouse were left 
partially open, however, what was growing in the greenhouse was subject to viewing from 
the air. Under the holding in Ciraolo, Riley could not reasonably have expected the contents 
of his greenhouse to be immune from examination by an officer seated in a fixed-wing 
aircraft flying in navigable airspace . . . .”), with id. at 453, 455 (O’Connor, J., concurring) 
(reasoning that, since Ciraolo relied on the fact that “public air travel at 1,000 feet is a 
sufficiently routine part of modern life,” “if the public can generally be expected to travel 
[via helicopter] over residential backyards at an altitude of 400 feet” then “Riley cannot 
reasonably expect his curtilage to be free from such aerial observation”). 
 118. See Justices 1789 to Present, supra note 59. 
 119. California v. Ciraolo, 476 U.S. 207, 215 (Powell, J., dissenting). 
 120. See Julie Johnson, Mendocino Marijuana Raids Reflect Stepped-Up Enforcement on 
Illegal Operators, PRESS DEMOCRAT (Santa Rosa, Cal.) (July 26, 2019), https://www. 
pressdemocrat.com/news/9830280-181/mendocino-marijuana-raids-reflect-californias. See 
generally PETER HECHT, WEED LAND: INSIDE AMERICA’S MARIJUANA EPICENTER AND HOW 
POT WENT LEGIT (2014). 
 121. Unfortunately, some police are inclined to use such stops aggressively. See 
generally MALCOLM GLADWELL, TALKING TO STRANGERS: WHAT WE SHOULD KNOW ABOUT 
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I began using this hypothetical in the early 1980s. At that time, the Court 
had concerns about pretextual police conduct.
122
 Lower courts occasionally 
inquired into whether a stop or search was pretextual.
123
 Also, the Supreme 
Court had suggested that some traffic violations may be too trivial to 
support a full custodial arrest and subsequent search of the vehicle under 
the Fourth Amendment.
124
 Well into the 2000s, though, and fueled in part 
                                                                                                                 
THE PEOPLE WE DON’T KNOW 6 (2019) (examining prejudiced and incompetent traffic stops 
as a symptom of social dysfunction in the United States). 
 122. See, e.g., Colorado v. Bertine, 479 U.S. 367, 372 (1987) (approving an automobile 
inventory search considering that there had been “no showing that the police . . . acted in bad 
faith or for the sole purpose of the investigation”); see also Steagald v. United States, 451 
U.S. 204, 215 (1981) (holding that using an arrest warrant to justify entry into a third party’s 
home is invalid due to an impermissible likelihood of its pretextual use); Colorado v. 
Bannister, 449 U.S. 1, 4 (1980) (per curiam) (finding that an officer’s approach of an 
automobile at a service station to issue a citation where he saw items that matched a 
description of recently stolen items was “entirely legitimate”); United States v. Robinson, 
414 U.S. 218, 221 n.1 (1973) (leaving open the possibility that different facts may invite 
inquiry into whether using a “subsequent traffic violation arrest as a mere pretext for a 
narcotics search” would be unconstitutional); id. at 248 (Marshall, J., dissenting) (“There is 
always the possibility that a police officer, lacking probable cause to obtain a search warrant, 
will use a traffic arrest as a pretext to conduct a search.”). 
 123. See, e.g., United States v. Smith, 80 F.3d 215, 219–20 (7th Cir. 1996) (asking, but 
not reaching, the question of whether a traffic stop was pretextual where an officer pulled 
over defendant’s car because the air freshener hanging by a string from his rear-view mirror 
was a material “obstruction” of his view); United States v. Scopo, 19 F.3d 777, 786 (2d Cir. 
1994) (Newman, C.J., concurring) (“[S]ome police officers will use the pretext of traffic 
violations or other minor infractions to harass members of groups identified by factors that 
are totally impermissible as a basis for law enforcement activity-factors such as race or 
ethnic origin, or simply appearances that some police officers do not like . . . .”); United 
States v. Strickland, 902 F.2d 937, 940 (11th Cir. 1990) (“[I]nvestigatory stops are invalid as 
pretextual unless ‘a reasonable officer would have made the seizure in the absence of 
illegitimate motivation.’” (quoting United States v. Smith, 799 F.2d 704, 708 (11th Cir. 
1986))); United States v. Guzman, 864 F.2d 1512, 1515 (10th Cir. 1988) (“A pretextual stop 
occurs when the police use a legal justification to make the stop in order to search a person 
or place, or to interrogate a person, for an unrelated serious crime for which they do not have 
the reasonable suspicion necessary to support a stop.”), overruled by United States v. 
Botero-Ospina, 71 F.3d 783 (10th Cir. 1995).  
 124. See Knowles v. Iowa, 525 U.S. 113, 114 (1998) (holding that a full search of a 
vehicle following issuance of a citation for speeding violated the Fourth Amendment); see 
also Delaware v. Prouse, 440 U.S. 648, 662–63 (1979) (“Were the individual subject to 
unfettered governmental intrusion every time he entered an automobile, the security 
guaranteed by the Fourth Amendment would be seriously circumscribed. . . . [P]eople are 
not shorn of all Fourth Amendment protection when they step from their homes onto the 
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by the War on Drugs, the answers to my hypothetical kept changing as 
police power kept expanding. 
To wit: in Whren v. United States, plain-clothes vice-squad officers made 
a traffic stop while patrolling in an area known for drug trafficking.
125
 
Viewed objectively, one would be hard pressed to explain why those 
officers would be interested in writing a traffic ticket.
126
 Of course, they 
were not. Instead, they observed two African American men and managed 
to escalate a traffic stop into a successful drug arrest.
127
 A unanimous Court 
rejected the defendants’ claim that the stop was pretextual.
128
 If the officers 
had probable cause to make a traffic stop—even though these officers 
seemed indifferent to enforcing traffic laws—the stop was lawful.
129
 
The Court gave short shrift to concerns about racial profiling
130
 and 
suggested that the motorists might raise an equal protection challenge.
131
 Of 
course, winning such a challenge is more theoretical than real.
132
 
So much for trying to limit discriminatory and arbitrary stops. But what 
then? What motorist does not violate some traffic statute on a regular basis? 
Who does not exceed the speed limit? If you doubt that, do an experiment 
the next time you are driving. See how many motorists stay at the posted 
speed. Indeed, if you find someone, see whether other motorists are 
                                                                                                                 
public sidewalks. Nor are they shorn of those interests when they step from the sidewalks 
into their automobiles.” (citing Adams v. Williams, 407 U.S. 143, 146 (1972))). 
 125. 517 U.S. 806, 808 (1996). 
 126. Would (or should) an officer see a “truck with temporary license plates and youthful 
occupants” that remained at a stop sign “for what seemed an unusually long period of time” 
and reasonably conclude that there must be a traffic violation in the works? Id. 
 127. See id. at 808, 810. 
 128. See id. at 813–16. 
 129. See id. at 818–19 (“The making of a traffic stop out of uniform does not remotely 
qualify as such an extreme practice, and so is governed by the usual rule that probable cause 
to believe the law has been broken ‘outbalances’ private interest in avoiding police 
contact.”). 
 130. Id. at 813. 
 131. Id. 
 132. See generally David A. Harris, Racial Profiling Redux, 22 ST. LOUIS U. PUB. L. REV. 
73 (2003) (discussing U.S. courts’ treatment of racial profiling cases post-Whren and post-
9/11); Albert W. Alschuler, Racial Profiling and the Constitution, 2002 U. CHI. LEGAL F. 
163, 164 (examining “the constitutionality of using racial classifications in police 
investigation[s]” under the “Fourth Amendment and the Equal Protection Clause”); Brandon 
Garrett, Remedying Racial Profiling, 33 COLUM. HUM. RTS. L. REV. 41 (2001) (describing, 
evaluating, and presenting potential solutions to racial profiling problems in policing). 
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tailgating that driver. While police can stop almost any motorist, can that 
stop lead to a custodial arrest? 
For many years, the Court left open the question whether some traffic 
offenses are so minor that allowing a custodial arrest for such an offense 
would violate the Fourth Amendment.
133
 Several justices suggested that the 
Fourth Amendment imposed some limits on an officer’s ability to make a 
custodial arrest.
134
 However, when the Court finally addressed the question 
of when custodial arrests are appropriate during a routine traffic stop in 
Atwater v. City of Lago Vista, it rejected such a limitation.
135
 It did so in an 
extreme example of overreaching by the police, demonstrating even further 
erosion of the Fourth Amendment. As summarized by the majority in a 5–4 
decision: 
According to Atwater’s complaint (the allegations of which we 
assume to be true for present purposes), [Officer] Turek 
approached the truck and “yell[ed]” something to the effect of 
“[w]e’ve met before” and “[y]ou’re going to jail.” He then called 
for backup and asked to see Atwater’s driver’s license and 
insurance documentation, which state law required her to 
carry. . . . When Atwater told Turek that she did not have the 
papers because her purse had been stolen the day before, Turek 
said that he had “heard that story two-hundred times.” 
 Atwater asked to take her “frightened, upset, and crying” 
children to a friend’s house nearby, but Turek told her, “[y]ou’re 
not going anywhere.” As it turned out, Atwater’s friend learned 
what was going on and soon arrived to take charge of the 
children. Turek then handcuffed Atwater, placed her in his squad 
car, and drove her to the local police station, where booking 
officers had her remove her shoes, jewelry, and eyeglasses, and 
empty her pockets. Officers took Atwater’s “mug shot” and 
                                                                                                                 
 133. The Court consistently engaged in a case-by-case reasonableness-balancing test. 
“To determine the constitutionality of a seizure ‘[w]e must balance the nature and quality of 
the intrusion on the individual’s Fourth Amendment interests against the importance of the 
governmental interests alleged to justify the intrusion.’” Tennessee v. Garner, 471 U.S. 1, 8 
  (quoting ). (1985) (alteration in original) United States v. Place, 462 U.S. 696, 703 (1983)
 134. See Delaware v. Prouse, 440 U.S. 648, 662–63 (1979) (“Were the individual subject 
to unfettered governmental intrusion every time he entered an automobile, the security 
guaranteed by the Fourth Amendment would be seriously circumscribed.”). 
 135. 532 U.S. 318, 323 (2001). 
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placed her, alone, in a jail cell for about one hour, after which 
she was taken before a magistrate and released on $310 bond.
136 
An angry officer who had prior experience with Atwater suggests some 
personal animus.
137
 Escalating the confrontation in front of two young 





 it is easy to imagine officers making similarly 
unwarranted stops based on purely racial animus.
140
  
Consider also a spin-off possibility: What if Officer Turek thought that 
state law allowed him to make a custodial arrest when in fact it did not? 
The Supreme Court has found on similar facts that the arresting officer did 
not violate the Fourth Amendment.
141
 
In Atwater’s case, Officer Turek did not find evidence of criminal 
activity in her car.
142
 Atwater sued the city for a violation of 42 U.S.C. § 
1983.
143
 Reconsider the hypothetical above. Once an officer, even one 
making an arrest for a minor traffic offense, makes a custodial arrest 
without violating the Fourth Amendment, consider the scope of the search 
incident to that arrest. 
The Court addressed that issue early in the War on Drugs. In New York v. 
Belton, an officer stopped a vehicle for speeding.
144
 The officer developed 
                                                                                                                 
 136. Id. at 324 (citations omitted). 
 137. Though the Court makes no mention of a personal history between the two, the 
officer’s statements that “[w]e’ve met before” and “[y]ou’re going to jail” suggest otherwise. 
Id. 
 138. Atwater was driving with her five-year-old and three-year-old with her in the front 
seat. Id. at 323. 
 139. Matthew Yi, Justices OK Jail for Minor Infractions / Woman Was Arrested for Seat-
Belt Offense, SFGATE (Apr. 25, 2001), https://www.sfgate.com/news/article/Justices-OK-
jail-for-minor-infractions-Woman-2927870.php. 
 140. See State v. Ladson, 979 P.2d 833, 836 (Wash. 1999) (en banc) (detailing a situation 
where two officers on gang patrol tail a car with two African-American men—one they had 
never seen before, one recognized from an unsubstantiated rumor—looking for a legal 
justification to make a stop, and the officers did not deny that the eventual stop was 
pretextual). 
 141. See Virginia v. Moore, 553 U.S. 164, 166, 178 (2008) (holding that a custodial 
arrest based on probable cause, although in violation of state law, is nonetheless lawful for 
purposes of the Fourth Amendment). 
 142. See Atwater, 532 U.S. at 324 (charging Atwater with only “driving without her 
seatbelt fastened, failing to secure her children in seatbelts, driving without a license, and 
failing to provide proof of insurance”). 
 143. Id. at 325. 
 144. 453 U.S. 454, 455 (1981). 
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probable cause to believe that the four occupants of the vehicle possessed 
marijuana and that the vehicle may have been stolen.
145
 Faced with four 
suspects, the officer ordered the four men to sit apart.
146
 The officer then 
inspected the interior of the vehicle and found Belton’s leather jacket.
147
 
Opening it on the scene, he found cocaine.
148
 The Court upheld the search 
of Belton’s jacket as a valid search incident to a lawful arrest.
149
  
The facts supported a finding that the officer acted reasonably: faced 
with four suspects, the lone officer had legitimate concerns about his safety 
and destruction of evidence.
150
 The majority, interested in articulating a 
bright-line rule, went far beyond a potential narrow holding.
151
 Instead, the 
Court held that when an officer makes a lawful arrest of an occupant or 
recent occupant of a vehicle on the highway, the officer can reasonably 
search the interior passenger compartment of that vehicle.
152
 The Fourth 




Prior to Belton’s demise, my hypothetical officer, even if he felt no 
concerns about safety and even if there was no evidence of the crime of 
arrest (speeding or a lane change without signaling), the Court gave him 
license to search anywhere in the vehicle. Uncertain was whether he could 
open locked containers, but elsewhere the Court held that an officer could 




                                                                                                                 
 145. Id. at 455–56. 
 146. Id. at 456. 
 147. Id. 
 148. Id. 
 149. Id. at 462–63. Justice Stewart’s opinion carried the votes of Chief Justice Burger 
and Justices Blackmun, Powell, and Rehnquist—the four Nixon appointees. See id. at 454, 
463, 472. Justice Stevens concurred but did not join in the majority’s reasoning. Id. at 463. 
Three justices dissented. Id. (Brennan, J., dissenting, joined by Marshall, J.); id. at 472 
(White, J., dissenting, joined by Marshall, J.). 
 150. See id. at 456 (majority opinion). 
 151. The Court had the legitimate opportunity to adhere to the “principle of primary 
justification” and limit its holding to situations where the concerns of officer safety and 
evidence destruction predominate.  
 152. Belton, 453 U.S. at 460. 
 153. Id. 
 154. See Wyoming v. Houghton, 526 U.S. 295, 307 (1999) (“We hold that police officers 
with probable cause to search a car may inspect passengers’ belongings found in the car that 
are capable of concealing the object of the search.”). 
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One can say so much about why the Court was wrong in Belton. 
Between the dissent, commentators, and lower courts, many have criticized 
the decision.
155
 A few observations suffice here. The dissent offered many 
examples to show that the bright line was not nearly as bright as 
suggested.
156
 Professor Wayne LaFave took no pleasure in the majority’s 
citation to his article, which supported bright lines in some circumstances, 
arguing that Belton was not a good example of the need for bright lines.
157
 
Many lower courts resisted application of Belton; in some instances, state 
courts relied on their constitutional equivalent of the Fourth Amendment, 
without more, to find such searches illegal.
158
 
                                                                                                                 
 155. See id. at 463 (Brennan, J., dissenting) (“The Court today turns its back on the 
product of [its search-incident-to-lawful-arrest] analysis, formulating an arbitrary ‘bright-
line’ rule applicable to ‘recent’ occupants of automobiles that fails to reflect Chimel’s 
underlying policy justifications.”); see also Myron Moskovitz, A Rule in Search of a 
Reason: An Empirical Reexamination of Chimel and Belton, 2002 WIS. L. REV. 657, 697 
(examining the Court’s claims justifying its Belton rule and empirical data on police 
practices and arrests) (“[T]he fact of custodial arrest should allow the police to search the 
clothing the arrestee is wearing, but not the area around him, unless particular and unusual 
facts justify such a search. The Court should reexamine Chimel and Belton.”). Many lower 
courts have rejected Belton’s reasoning as well. See infra note 158. 
 156. Belton, 453 U.S. at 469 (Brennan, J., dissenting) (“The Court’s new approach leaves 
open too many questions and, more important, it provides the police and the courts with too 
few tools with which to find the answers.”). 
 157. After Belton, Professor LaFave explained his position on “bright lines” more fully. 
See Wayne R. LaFave, The Fourth Amendment in an Imperfect World: On Drawing “Bright 
Lines” and “Good Faith”, 43 U. PITT. L. REV. 307, 325–26 (1982). 
 158. See, e.g., State v. Gaskins, 866 N.W.2d 1, 12 (Iowa 2015) (“We now agree with the 
approach taken by the courts that have rejected the Belton rule that authorized warrantless 
searches of containers without regard to the Chimel considerations of officer safety and 
protecting evidence.”); see also State v. Rowell, 188 P.3d 95, 100 (N.M. 2008) (“[W]e 
decline the invitation of the State to follow the federal line of cases represented by 
Belton . . . .”); Holman v. State, 183 P.3d 368, 377 (Wyo. 2008) (“[Following Belton] would 
be creating a bright-line rule allowing the search of an entire vehicle any time a lone driver 
is arrested, irrespective of probable cause or other surrounding circumstances.”); State v. 
Bauder, 924 A.2d 38, 45, 47 (Vt. 2007) (“The concerns identified in the Belton dissent have 
continued to gather support from courts and commentators alike. . . . [Vermont] rejected 
Belton in favor of the traditional rule requiring that officers demonstrate a need to secure 
their own safety or preserve evidence of a crime . . . .”); Camacho v. State, 75 P.3d 370, 376 
(Nev. 2003) (“[W]e hold that the Nevada Constitution requires both probable cause and 
exigent circumstances to justify a warrantless search of an automobile incident to a lawful 
custodial arrest.”); State v. Pierce, 642 A.2d 947, 955, 959 (N.J. 1994) (“The Court’s holding 
in Belton has been widely criticized. . . . We hold only that under article I, paragraph 7 of the 
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Although Justice Stewart wrote the majority opinion in both Belton and 
Chimel, most commentators reject his claim that the cases are consistent.
159
 
As suggested above, Chimel is a classic Warren Court-era case focusing on 
the principle of particular justification.
160
 Belton’s bright-line rule, on the 
other hand, is over-inclusive: the rule allowed police to search based on the 
legal arrest in a host of situations in which the underlying justifications did 
not apply.
161
 But Belton’s bright line may not have been as bright as it 
seemed, as it left much room for interpretation on slightly different facts: 
What if, instead of four suspects and one officer, several police surrounded 
a single driver and detained the driver? What if occupants of the vehicle 
have left the vehicle and are now some distance from the car?
162
 Are they 
still “recent occupant[s]?”
163
 What if the suspect is approaching her 
vehicle—does the rule apply in such a case?
164
 What if police follow sound 
procedures by putting the motorist in the police vehicle and only later seek 
to return to the vehicle for a full search of its contents?
165
 
                                                                                                                 
 the rule of Belton shall not apply to warrantless arrests for motor-New Jersey Constitution
vehicle offenses.”). 
 159. See, e.g., Moskovitz, supra note 155, at 673–74, 677 (“[S]trange scenario[s] would 
have to be the norm for Belton to mesh with Chimel’s rationales for a search incident to 
arrest.”). 
 160. See supra Section II.A. 
 161. The Court itself noted how the rule applied to situations outside any justifying 
principle. See Belton, 453 U.S. at 461 (“It is true, of course, that these containers [which 
police are now lawfully able to search] will sometimes be such that they could hold neither a 
weapon nor evidence of the criminal conduct for which the suspect was arrested.”). 
 162. The Court held that it did not affect the police’s ability to search a suspect’s vehicle 
when he had already parked and exited the car before his arrest. See Thornton v. United 
States, 541 U.S. 615, 623–24 (2004) (applying the Belton rule “[s]o long as an arrestee is the 
sort of ‘recent occupant’ of a vehicle such as [the defendant] was [in Thornton], officers may 
search that vehicle incident to the arrest”). 
 163. Belton, 453 U.S. at 460. 
 164. The dissenters in Belton raised similar concerns. Id. at 470 (Brennan, J., dissenting) 
(“Does it matter whether the suspect is standing in close proximity to the car when the 
search is conducted? Does it matter whether the police formed probable cause to arrest 
before or after the suspect left his car?”). 
 165. Lower courts divided on this question following Belton. Compare United States v. 
McCrady, 774 F.2d 868, 870, 875 (8th Cir. 1985) (upholding a search of an automobile 
which took place immediately after an occupant had been arrested and placed in the police 
car), with United States v. Vasey, 834 F.2d 782, 787 (9th Cir. 1987) (suppressing evidence 
from a search while the defendant was handcuffed in a police vehicle because “it is evident 
that the search was not properly limited to the area within Vasey’s immediate control”). 
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The previous examples demonstrate why the Court would eventually 
overrule Belton. Despite Justice Stevens’s attempt to deny that his lead 
opinion in Arizona v. Gant overruled Belton,
166
 almost no one takes his 
claim seriously.
167
 For now, however, Belton is a dramatic example of the 
Court’s War on Drugs case law, further eroding Fourth Amendment 




By the late 2000s, the Court had had enough with such sweeping police 
power: as indicated, the Court overruled Belton.
169
 Nonetheless, Belton 
demonstrates yet another example of the Court’s willingness to erode 
Fourth Amendment protection to advance the War on Drugs.  
4. Unknowing and Irrational Waiver of Fourth Amendment Rights or 
“Consent?” 
Police have largely unchecked authority to make traffic stops. So, 
assume that, lacking authority to arrest or probable cause to search the 
vehicle, an officer asked the driver to consent to a search of her vehicle. 
Assume also—as is so often the case—the driver did consent, leading to the 
discovery of a significant amount of drugs. Did the driver make a voluntary 
and knowing waiver of her Fourth Amendment right to be free from an 
unreasonable search?  
                                                                                                                 
 166. Arizona v. Gant, 556 U.S. 332, 343 (2009) (rejecting a broad reading of Belton). 
 167. Even other Justices on the Court saw that Gant overruled Belton. Id. at 355 (Alito, 
J., dissenting) (“Today’s decision effectively overrules those important decisions [Belton and 
Thornton], even though respondent Gant has not asked us to do so.”); see, e.g., Barbara E. 
Armacost, Arizona v. Gant: Does it Matter?, 2009 SUP. CT. REV. 275, 278–79 (“For all 
practical purposes [Gant] means the end of Belton searches incident to arrest . . . .”). 
 168. Like in many cases in which the Court restricted or cabined Fourth Amendment 
protections, the defendant in Belton faced drug possession charges. Belton, 453 U.S. at 462 
(“It is not questioned that the respondent was the subject of a lawful custodial arrest on a 
charge of possessing marihuana.”); Rudovsky, supra note 1, at 240 n.16 (listing seventeen 
cases where the Court “sustained searches or seizures in the drug enforcement context in the 
ten-year period of 1980–1990”). 
 169. Gant, 556 U.S. at 343 (“To read Belton as authorizing a vehicle search incident to 
every recent occupant’s arrest would thus untether the rule from the justifications underlying 
the Chimel exception. . . . Accordingly, we reject this reading of Belton and hold that the 
Chimel rationale authorizes police to search a vehicle incident to a recent occupant’s arrest 
only when the arrestee is unsecured and within reaching distance of the passenger 
compartment at the time of the search.”); see also Davis v. United States, 564 U.S. 229, 
234–35 (2011) (recognizing that Gant “adopted a new, two-part rule,” abrogating Belton). 
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If that hypothetical seems extreme, look at Florida v. Jimeno.
170
 
Although the issue in Jimeno related to the scope of the defendant’s 
consent,
171
 the facts provide a dramatic example of the irrationality of many 
offenders’ consent to search. There, an officer stopped the defendant for a 
traffic violation and told the defendant that he had reason to believe that the 
defendant possessed drugs.
172
 The officer lacked probable cause to arrest or 
to search.
173
 The defendant consented to the search, leading to the discovery 
of a kilogram of cocaine.
174
 Consider whether the defendant made an 
informed choice whether to consent to the search of his vehicle. If, as it 
seems was the case, the officer lacked a justification to arrest or to search 
the vehicle, the defendant faced the following options: to refuse to consent 
and—absent a means for the officer to develop probable cause—leave the 
scene, or to allow the search and face many years in prison.
175
 
The Supreme Court’s consent case law began to evolve in the 1970s, 
after the shift in the Court’s makeup.
176
 In Schneckloth v. Bustamonte, the 
Court resolved a question that had divided lower courts: what did the state 
have to show when it claimed that a defendant consented to a search?
177
 
Arguably, a person consenting to a search is waiving one’s Fourth 
Amendment rights. If so, the state would need to show that the decision was 
informed. Some courts held that the state had to demonstrate that the 
suspect knew of the right to refuse to consent.
178
 Defendants relied on the 
FBI’s practice of warning suspects of their right to withhold consent as 
support that the practice was practical.
179
 Further, courts that supported 
such a showing could point to Miranda v. Arizona for support.
180
 The 
Miranda Court was concerned with a case-by-case, voluntariness approach 
                                                                                                                 
 170. 500 U.S. 248 (1991). 
 171. Id. at 249. 
 172. Id. 
 173. The officer had only “overheard . . . what appeared to be a drug transaction over a 
public telephone.” Id. 
 174. Id. at 250 (emphasis added). 
 175. Federal sentencing statutes for the kilogram of cocaine require between five and 
forty years of imprisonment, a fine of $5,000,000, or both. 21 U.S.C. § 841(b)(1)(B) (2018). 
 176. See supra Section II.B. 
 177. 412 U.S. 218, 223 (1973). 
 178. See, e.g., Schoepflin v. United States, 391 F.2d 390, 399 (9th Cir. 1968) (remanding 
on the issue of whether the defendant “knew he could freely and effectively withhold his 
consent”). 
 179. Bustamonte, 412 U.S. at 287 (Marshall, J., dissenting). 
 180. Id. at 281. 
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and insisted on warnings to assure that the suspect knew that silence was an 
option.
181
 Bustamonte rejected such a requirement.
182
  
 Though not entirely clear until subsequent cases, the Court rejected the 
idea that a consent to search is a waiver of one’s Fourth Amendment 
rights.
183
 Instead, the Court’s analysis treats consent as a matter of 
reasonableness.
184
 Rather than focusing on the defendant’s state of mind, 
the Court asks whether police were reasonable in their conduct,
185
 including 
cases where they lack consent, but reasonably believe that they have 
consent.
186
 While the Court decided Bustamonte in the 1970s, the Court has 
repeatedly expanded its reasonableness analysis into the 1990s and 
beyond.
187
 This reasonableness inquiry proved to be a powerful tool in the 
War on Drugs. 
Case law is replete with instances like Jimeno where suspects seemingly 
make irrational choices. Instead of refusing consent, they acquiesce; instead 
of driving away in freedom, they condemn themselves to prison terms.
188
 
                                                                                                                 
 181. See Miranda v. Arizona, 384 U.S. 436, 465 (1966) (“The abdication of the 
constitutional privilege—the choice on his part to speak to the police—was not made 
knowingly or competently because of the failure to apprise him of his rights . . . .”). 
 182. 412 U.S. at 248–49. 
 183. See, e.g., Illinois v. Rodriguez, 497 U.S. 177, 188 (1990) (“But as we have 
discussed, what is at issue when a claim of apparent consent is raised is not whether the right 
to be free of searches has been waived, but whether the right to be free of unreasonable 
searches has been violated.”). 
 184. See id. at 188–89 (holding that warrantless entry is valid when based upon consent 
of third party whom police, at time of entry, reasonably believe to possess common authority 
over premises); see also Georgia v. Randolph, 547 U.S. 103, 106 (2006) (holding that a 
warrantless search was unreasonable as to defendant who was physically present and 
expressly refused to consent); Fernandez v. California, 571 U.S. 292, 298 (2014) (reasoning 
that a “warrant is generally required for a search of a home,” but “the ultimate touchstone of 
the Fourth Amendment is reasonableness”) (citations omitted). 
 185. See Rodriguez, 497 U.S. at 185 (“It is apparent that in order to satisfy the 
‘reasonableness’ requirement of the Fourth Amendment, what is generally demanded of the 
many factual determinations that must regularly be made by agents of the government . . . is 
not that they always be correct, but that they always be reasonable.”). 
 186. See id. at 188–89 (clarifying that the Court did not decide the issue of 
reasonableness on the facts of the case but held that if the search was reasonable, then it 
would have been constitutionally permissible). 
 187. See, e.g., id.; Kyllo v. United States, 533 U.S. 27, 31 (2001) (explaining that the 
correct question is “whether the warrantless search of a home is reasonable and hence 
constitutional”). 
 188. See, e.g., RICHARD VAN DUIZEND ET AL., THE SEARCH WARRANT PROCESS: 
PRECONCEPTIONS, PERCEPTIONS, PRACTICES 19 (1985) (reporting that one of the most 
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There are numerous cases where officers have stopped motorists on the 
highway and managed to find drugs, despite lacking any level of 
suspicion.
189
 Consent has proven to be a powerful tool for law enforcement. 
In shifting the focus away from the idea that the consenting individual is 
waiving a constitutional right, the Court has never adequately explained 
why reasonableness, not waiver, is the critical question in such cases. The 
Bustamonte Court seemed more interested in upholding a useful police tool 
than in offering a coherent principle justifying consent searches.
190
 No 
doubt, the Court’s consent case law has expanded police power to search 
for drugs without probable cause.
191
 While advancing the War on Drugs, 
the Court’s consent case law continued to erode Fourth Amendment 
protections. 
  
                                                                                                                 
common warrant “exceptions” is consent and suggesting that ninety-eight percent of 
warrantless searches fall under the “consent” umbrella, even though there is no precise data 
on point). 
 189. See, e.g., People v. Zuniga, 372 P.3d 1052, 1054 (Colo. 2016) (holding that odor of 
marijuana could contribute to probable cause determination); see also Illinois v. Caballes, 
543 U.S. 405, 406, 410 (2005) (holding that an otherwise lawful traffic stop where another 
officer arrived at the scene while the stop was in progress and used a narcotics-detection dog 
to sniff around the exterior of the motorist’s vehicle did not infringe the motorist’s Fourth 
Amendment rights). 
 190. See Schneckloth v. Bustamonte, 412 U.S. 218, 225 (1973) (“[The] need for police 
questioning [is] a tool for the effective enforcement of criminal laws. Without such 
investigation, those who were innocent might be falsely accused, those who were guilty 
might wholly escape prosecution, and many crimes would go unsolved. In short, the security 
of all would be diminished.”) (citations omitted)). Remember that officers have almost 
unchecked power to stop any motorist for some traffic violation. Defendants are largely 
unable to challenge an officer’s racial motivation in making the vehicle stop. Further, many 
commentators believe that minority members are less likely than non-minorities to refuse 
consent out of fear of unbridled police power. 
 191. See, e.g., Florida v. Bostick, 501 U.S. 429, 431–32, 439–40 (1991) (holding that 
random bus searches conducted pursuant to passenger’s consent are not per se 
unconstitutional even where there is no probable cause to search); see also Draper v. United 
States, 358 U.S. 307, 309–10, 314 (1959) (holding that where a government agent was given 
information by an informer who had proved reliable in the past and agent observed 
defendant who fit the description, there were reasonable grounds for believing that defendant 
was committing a violation of the federal laws relating to narcotic drugs). For a percentage 
of searches resulting from “consent,” see VAN DUIZEND ET AL., supra note 188. 
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III. Reclaiming Constitutional Principles? 
By the 2010s, a consensus began to emerge that the War on Drugs was a 
failure. As developed in this section, the Supreme Court seems to have 
noticed that fact and begun to revitalize the Fourth Amendment. 
As discussed above, New York v. Belton offered police extensive 
authority to search a person’s vehicle as long as the officer made a lawful 
arrest.
192
 In theory, the Court’s ruling created a bright-line rule for police 
making such arrests.
193
 At the same time, especially when viewed in 
conjunction with other cases, Belton created authority that grossly exceeded 
the underlying rationales for such searches.
194
  
The Court’s decision in Thornton v. United States
195
 signaled trouble for 
Belton. There, the police had not stopped Thornton’s vehicle, but saw that 
his license plate was not registered for his vehicle.
196
 Police approached 
him after he had already exited his vehicle.
197
 The police arrested him and 
placed him in the back of a patrol car.
198
 Any claim that the defendant could 
destroy evidence or grab a weapon would have been frivolous.
199
 Despite 
that, the Court authorized the search of Thornton’s vehicle.
200
 Three justices 
                                                                                                                 
 192. 453 U.S. 454 (1981); see also infra Section II.C.3. 
 193. See Belton, 453 U.S. at 462–63 (creating the bright-line rule that incident to a lawful 
arrest, the police may search the area within the arrestee’s immediate control, including the 
passenger compartment and anything found therein). 
 194. See infra Section II.C.3 (discussing Belton and the underlying rationales for 
exceptions to the probable cause plus warrant requirements). 
 195. 541 U.S. 615 (2004). 
 196. Id. at 618. 
 197. Id. 
 198. Id. 
 199. Thornton was not in his vehicle nor near it at the time the officer approached him. 
This, seemingly, would signal that Belton should not govern given that the rationale under 
Belton includes concerns for officer safety when a vehicle passenger is in reaching distance 
of closed compartments. Id. at 625 (Scalia, J., concurring) (“When petitioner’s car was 
searched in this case, he was neither in, nor anywhere near, the passenger compartment of 
his vehicle. Rather, he was handcuffed and secured in the back of the officer’s squad car. 
The risk that he would nevertheless ‘grab a weapon or evidentiary ite[m]’ from his car was 
remote in the extreme. The Court’s effort to apply our current doctrine to this search 
stretches it beyond its breaking point, and for that reason I cannot join the Court’s 
opinion.”). 
 200. See id. at 621, 623–24 (majority opinion) (holding that Belton governs even when an 
officer does not make contact until the person arrested has left the vehicle and that, under 
Belton, the Fourth Amendment allows an officer to search a vehicle’s passenger 
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dissented, signaling grave doubts about the soundness of the holding.
201
 
Justice Scalia, joined by Justice Ginsburg, concurred in the judgment but 
expressed doubts about Belton as well.
202
 
—Ultimately, the Court overruled Belton in Arizona v. Gant despite 
Justice Stevens’ claim to the contrary in his majority opinion.
203
 Gant 
reverted to an earlier method of analysis: framing the warrant clause as the 
major premise of the Fourth Amendment, and requiring any exceptions to 
probable cause and warrants to be tied to an underlying rationale supporting 
the exception.
204
 Hence, police can search a vehicle incident to a lawful 
arrest only if the arrestee can still gain access to the interior of the vehicle 
(officer safety rationale) or if officers have a reason to believe that evidence 




Technology has always presented the Court with tough-to-decide cases. 
For example, when the Court first began to consider whether the Fourth 
Amendment applied in cases where the police engaged in wiretapping, the 
                                                                                                                 
compartment as a contemporaneous incident of arrest, even when officer does not make 
contact until the person arrested has already left the vehicle). 
 201. See id. at 624–25 (O’Connor, J., concurring in part); see id. at 636 (Stevens, J., 
joined by Souter, J., dissenting). 
 202. See id. at 625 (Scalia, J., joined by Ginsburg, J., concurring) (“I see three reasons 
why the search in this case might have been justified to protect officer safety or prevent 
concealment or destruction of evidence. None ultimately persuades me.”). 
 203. See 556 U.S. 332, 343 (2009) (“Under this broad reading of Belton, a vehicle search 
would be authorized incident to every arrest of a recent occupant notwithstanding that in 
most cases the vehicle’s passenger compartment will not be within the arrestee’s reach at the 
time of the search. To read Belton as authorizing a vehicle search incident to every recent 
occupant’s arrest would thus untether the rule from the justifications underlying the Chimel 
exception—a result clearly incompatible with our statement in Belton that it ‘in no way 
alters the fundamental principles established in the Chimel case regarding the basic scope of 
searches incident to lawful custodial arrests.’ Accordingly, we reject this reading of Belton 
and hold that the Chimel rationale authorizes police to search a vehicle incident to a recent 
occupant’s arrest only when the arrestee is unsecured and within reaching distance of the 
passenger compartment at the time of the search.”) (citation omitted). 
 204. See id. at 337–38 (“Relying on our earlier decision in Chimel, . . . the search-
incident-to-arrest exception to the warrant requirement is justified by interests in officer 
safety and evidence preservation. When ‘the justifications underlying Chimel no longer exist 
because the scene is secure and the arrestee is handcuffed, secured in the back of a patrol 
car, and under the supervision of an officer,’ the court concluded, a ‘warrantless search of 
the arrestee’s car cannot be justified as necessary to protect the officers at the scene or 
prevent the destruction of evidence.’”) (citations omitted). 
 205. See id. 
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Court initially found that it did not because words are not capable of being 
seized.
206
 Further, because of the facts of the case at issue, the police did not 
trespass on the defendant’s property.
207
 Over time, the Court reversed itself 
on both grounds.
208
 First, it held that when police use listening devices they 
.are seizing words
209




Throughout the War on Drugs, state and federal governments usually 
won in cases involving technology.
211
 For example, the Court held in 
United States v. Knotts that the police did not conduct a search when they 
attached a beeper to a container that they knew would be in the defendant’s 
possession.
212
 Even though the beeper allowed the police to locate the 
defendant without fear of detection, the Court found that such a device 
                                                                                                                 
 206. See, e.g., Olmstead v. United States, 277 U.S. 438, 466–66 (1928) (holding that 
wiretapping of defendant did not constitute an unreasonable search or seizure because the 
insertions of the wires were made without trespass upon any property and finding no 
justification for extending the persons, places, and things language of the Fourth 
Amendment to spoken words).  
 207. Id. at 466. 
 208. See Katz v. United States, 389 U.S. 347, 353 (1967) (“Indeed, we have expressly 
held that the Fourth Amendment governs not only the seizure of tangible items, but extends 
as well to the recording of oral statements overheard without any ‘technical trespass under 
local property law.’” (quoting Silverman v. United States, 365 U.S. 505, 511 (1961))). 
 209. See id. (emphasis added). 
 210. See id. (holding that the government’s activities in electronically listening to and 
recording defendant’s words spoken into telephone receiver in public telephone booth 
violated the privacy upon which defendant justifiably relied and thus constituted a “search 
and seizure” within the Fourth Amendment, and the fact that the electronic device employed 
to achieve that end did not happen to penetrate the wall of the booth had no constitutional 
significance). 
 211. See, e.g., Florida v. Riley, 488 U.S. 445, 451–52 (1989) (determining that an 
expectation of privacy from aerial observation by helicopters legally within the airspace 
above one’s partially open-roof greenhouse is unreasonable); California v. Ciraolo, 476 U.S. 
207, 215 (1986) (determining that an expectation of privacy from aerial observation of one’s 
fenced-in yard is unreasonable); Knotts v. United States, 460 U.S. 276, 285 (1983) 
(determining that monitoring beeper signals did not invade any legitimate expectation of 
privacy and, thus, was not a search or seizure); Smith v. Maryland, 442 U.S. 735, 736, 745–
46 (1979) (using a pen register to record the numbers dialed by a phone did not invade any 
legitimate expectation of privacy and, thus, was not a search and no warrant was required).  
 212. 460 U.S. 276, 278, 285 (1983). 
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merely enhanced the police officers’ senses.
213
 After all, the defendant 
appeared on public highways, in open view to members of the public.
214
  
The latter point—that a person knowingly reveals information to 
members of the public—was a pivotal argument in subsequent cases. Thus, 
when a suspect makes a phone call from his home phone, he reveals 
information to his phone company.
215
 If police then gain access to that same 
information, the suspect cannot claim a reasonable expectation of privacy 
because he already knowingly exposed the information to a third party.
216
 
Beginning in 2012, the Court confronted the reality that technology has 
changed since the 1980s.
217
 In United States v. Jones, the government 
twenty-eighttracked the defendant’s car for  days by attaching a GPS 
tracking device to the vehicle.
218
 The device relayed two thousand pages of 
information about Jones’ movements.
219
 The government argued that the 
federal agents’ conduct was not a search, largely in reliance on the Court’s 
earlier holding in Knotts.
220
 During oral argument, some of the questions 
and answers focused on that issue: how were the facts different from those 
                                                                                                                 
 213. See id. at 282. 
 214. See id. (reasoning that a person travelling in an automobile on public thoroughfares 
has no reasonable expectation of privacy in his movements from one place to another); see 
also United States v. Karo, 468 U.S. 705, 709, 720 (1984) (reasoning that where monitoring 
of beeper revealed nothing about contents of locker that two respondents had rented, there 
was no “search” of that locker, which was identified only when agents traversing public 
parts of facility found that smell of ether was coming from specific locker); Kyllo v. United 
States, 533 U.S. 27, 40 (2001) (“Where . . . the Government uses a device that is not in 
general public use, to explore details of the home that would previously have been 
unknowable without physical intrusion, the surveillance is a ‘search’ and is presumptively 
unreasonable without a warrant.”). Notice that the holding in Kyllo left open another 
knowing exposure to the public exception wherein a search would not be found if the 
technology at issue was in public use or the heightened technology was not needed to 
discover the contents of the home. 
215. See, e.g., Smith v. Maryland, 442 U.S. 735, 745 (1979) (holding that installation and 
use of a pen register by a telephone company does not constitute a “search” within the 
meaning of the Fourth Amendment). 
 216. See id. at 745–46.  
 217. See, e.g., United States v. Jones, 565 U.S. 400, 427 (2012) (Alito, J., concurring) 
(discussing how to apply the Fourth Amendment analysis to cover changing and evolving 
technology). 
 218. Id. at 403. 
 219. Id. 
 220. Id. at 408–09.   
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 If following a suspect’s vehicle via a beeper is not a search, 
how can it be a search in Jones?
222
 Would the agents’ conduct become a 
search on the second day, the third day or sometime thereafter?
223
  
The Jones Court was unanimous in finding for the defendant: the agents’ 
conduct was a search.
224
 The five-justice majority found that the federal 
agents physically trespassed by attaching the GPS device to the car.
225
 By 
resolving the case via physical trespass, the Court sidestepped the harder 
question: when does the government’s conduct cross the threshold from 
mere observation to a Fourth Amendment search?
226
 Justice Alito, writing 
for four justices, would have found for Jones on reasonable expectation of 
privacy grounds.
227
 He recognized that dramatic changes in technology 
present hard questions for the Court under its Katz expectation of privacy 
analysis.
228
 He also suggested that short-term monitoring, as in Knotts, was 
                                                                                                                 
 221. United States v. Jones, OYEZ, https://www.oyez.org/cases/2011/10-1259 (last visited 
Sept. 16, 2020). 
 222. See Jones, 565 U.S. at 408–09 (distinguishing the facts of Knotts from those at 
issue). 
 223. See id. at 412 (“What of a 2–day monitoring of a suspected purveyor of stolen 
electronics? Or of a 6–month monitoring of a suspected terrorist? We may have to grapple 
with these ‘vexing problems’ in some future case where a classic trespassory search is not 
involved.”). See generally Orin S. Kerr, The Mosaic Theory of the Fourth Amendment, 111 
MICH. L. REV. 311 (2012). 
 224. Jones, 565 U.S. at 404 (majority opinion); id. at 414 (Sotomayor, J., concurring); id. 
at 431 (Alito, J., concurring). 
 225. Id. at 404–05 (majority opinion). 
 226. See id. at 412 (“It may be that achieving the same result through electronic means, 
without an accompanying trespass, is an unconstitutional invasion of privacy, but the present 
case does not require us to answer that question.”). 
 227. Id. at 419 (Alito, J., concurring) (“I would analyze the question presented in this 
case by asking whether respondent’s reasonable expectations of privacy were violated by the 
long-term monitoring of the movements of the vehicle he drove.”). 
 228. Id. at 427 (“The Katz expectation-of-privacy test avoids the problems and 
complications noted above, but it is not without its own difficulties. It involves a degree of 
circularity, and judges are apt to confuse their own expectations of privacy with those of the 
hypothetical reasonable person to which the Katz test looks. In addition, the Katz test rests 
on the assumption that this hypothetical reasonable person has a well-developed and stable 
set of privacy expectations. But technology can change those expectations. Dramatic 
technological change may lead to periods in which popular expectations are in flux and may 
ultimately produce significant changes in popular attitudes. New technology may provide 
increased convenience or security at the expense of privacy, and many people may find the 
tradeoff worthwhile. And even if the public does not welcome the diminution of privacy that 
new technology entails, they may eventually reconcile themselves to this development as 
inevitable.”) (citations omitted) (footnote omitted); id. at 430 (“To date, however, Congress 
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not a search, but that he would have considered longer term GPS 
monitoring as constituting a search.
229
 Given that the government 
monitored Jones for four weeks, Alito concluded that this surveillance 
crossed the line and became a Fourth Amendment search.
230
 Only Justice 
Sotomayor, concurring in judgement to give Scalia a fifth vote, suggested 
that even short-term GPS monitoring might violate the “existence of a 
reasonable societal expectation of privacy.”
231
 
Similarly, the Court narrowed its search-incident-to-lawful-arrest 
doctrine in light of developing technology.
232
 In Riley v. California, a 
nearly unanimous Court found that an officer who finds a person’s cell 
phone (even a flip-phone) may not look for evidence in the phone incident 
to that arrest.
233
 Lower courts that had previously upheld such searches 
analogized the cell phone to a package, like the crumpled-up cigarette 
package found on the suspect in United States v. Robinson.
234
 The Court, 




                                                                                                                 
and most States have not enacted statutes regulating the use of GPS tracking technology for 
law enforcement purposes. The best that we can do in this case is to apply existing Fourth 
Amendment doctrine and to ask whether the use of GPS tracking in a particular case 
involved a degree of intrusion that a reasonable person would not have anticipated.”). 
 229. Id. at 430 (“Under this approach, relatively short-term monitoring of a person’s 
movements on public streets accords with expectations of privacy that our society has 
recognized as reasonable. But the use of longer term GPS monitoring in investigations of 
most offenses impinges on expectations of privacy.”) (citation omitted). 
 230. Id. 
 231. Id. at 415, 416 (Sotomayor, J., concurring) (“In cases involving even short-term 
monitoring, some unique attributes of GPS surveillance relevant to the Katz analysis will 
require particular attention. GPS monitoring generates a precise, comprehensive record of a 
person’s public movements that reflects a wealth of detail about her familial, political, 
professional, religious, and sexual associations.”) (citation omitted). 
 232. See, e.g., Riley v. California, 573 U.S. 373, 385 (2014) (“These cases require us to 
decide how the search incident to arrest doctrine applies to modern cell phones, which are 
now such a pervasive and insistent part of daily life that the proverbial visitor from Mars 
might conclude they were an important feature of human anatomy.”). 
 233. Id. at 403. 
 234. See, e.g., United States v. Finley, 477 F.3d 250, 259–60 (5th Cir. 2007) (citing 
Robinson for the proposition that “[t]he permissible scope of a search incident to a lawful 
arrest extends to containers found on the arrestee’s person”). 
 235. Riley, 573 U.S. at 387, 388–91 (discussing in depth the differences between cell 
phones and other packages, especially noting that under the search-incident-to-arrest 
exception, interest in protecting police officers’ safety does not justify dispensing with 
warrant requirement before officers can search digital data on arrestees’ cell phones because 
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Finally, in Carpenter v. United States, modern technology again changed 
the way the Court conducted its Fourth Amendment analysis.
236
 There, after 
the arrest of suspected robbers, prosecutors had petitioned the lower court 
for an order to obtain cell phone records for the petitioner.
237
 On review, the 
Supreme Court held that a person has a justifiable expectation of privacy in 
data that reveals such “detailed” and “encyclopedic” information about 
one’s activities.
238
 Chief Justice Roberts emphasized that the Court’s 
decision was a narrow one, leaving open several related questions.
239
 
One might explain Jones, Riley, and Carpenter as merely technology 
cases, not a signal of the Court’s general willingness to rethink its War on 
Drugs era Fourth Amendment case law. However, Gant is not the only case 
that suggests a broader willingness to rethink those cases. In Florida v. 
Jardines, for example, the police attempted to corroborate a tip that the 
defendant was growing marijuana in his home.
240
 Officers did so by taking 
a drug-sniffing dog to the defendant’s home.
241
 The dog signaled the 
presence of marijuana.
242
 After the dog’s signaling, one of the detectives 
applied for, and received, a search warrant that led to the discovery and 
seizure of marijuana in the defendant’s home.
243
  
Had the Court wanted to rely on War on Drugs case law, it could have 
found for the state. In one case after another, the Court had previously 
found that a person does not have a reasonable expectation of privacy when 
members of the public have access to information claimed to be private.
244
 
                                                                                                                 
digital data stored on phones could not itself be used as weapon to harm officers or to 
effectuate arrestees’ escape). 
 236. See 138 S. Ct. 2206, 2217, 2223 (2018) (reasoning that a person does not surrender 
all Fourth Amendment protection by venturing into the public sphere, and to the contrary, 
what one seeks to preserve as private, even in an area accessible to the public, may be 
constitutionally protected). 
 237. Id. at 2212. 
 238. Id. at 2216, 2223. 
 239. Id. at 2220. 
 240. 569 U.S. 1, 3–4 (2013). 
 241. Id. 
 242. Id. at 4. 
 243. Id. 
 244. See, e.g., California v. Greenwood, 486 U.S. 35, 41–42 (1988); Oliver v. United 
States, 466 U.S. 170, 182–83 (1984); United States v. Knotts, 460 U.S. 276, 285 (1983); 
Smith v. Maryland, 442 U.S. 735, 745–46 (1979). Remember Ciraolo, where the Court 
found that police did not conduct a search after they developed a view of the defendant’s 
“[ ]fenced-in backyard from the vantage of a small airplane because a ny member of the 
[ ] ” California v. Ciraolo, 476 U.S. 207, 213 (1986). flying  public  would have the same view. 
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As such, in Jardines, the Court might easily have found, based on its War 
on Drugs cases, that exposing the defendant’s home to a dog sniff was not a 
search.
245
 Nevertheless, writing for five justices, Justice Scalia found that 
the police conduct amounted to a trespass, thereby implicating the Fourth 
Amendment.
246
 While also joining Justice Scalia in judgment, Justices 
Kagan, Ginsburg, and Sotomayor found that the conduct amounted to a 




                                                                                                                 
The Court did not care that a person in flight might lack the incentive to look closely at 
dactivity in the defendant’s backyard—as opposed to the police, who carefully scrutinize  
See id. at 213–14 (“Any member of the public flying in activity in the defendant’s curtilage. 
this airspace who glanced down could have seen everything that these officers observed. On 
this record, we readily conclude that respondent’s expectation that his garden was protected 
from such observation is unreasonable and is not an expectation that society is prepared to 
honor.”) (footnote omitted)); see also id. at 224–25 (Powell, J., dissenting) (“But the Court 
fails to acknowledge the qualitative difference between police surveillance and other uses 
made of the airspace. Members of the public use the airspace for travel, business, or 
pleasure, not for the purpose of observing activities taking place within residential yards. 
Here, police conducted an overflight at low altitude solely for the purpose of discovering 
evidence of crime within a private enclave into which they were constitutionally forbidden 
to intrude at ground level without a warrant. It is not easy to believe that our society is 
prepared to force individuals to bear the risk of this type of warrantless police intrusion into 
their residential areas.”) (footnote omitted). 
 245. See 569 U.S. at 10–11 (“[T]he Government argued that the Katz standard ‘show[ed] 
that no search occurred,’ as the defendant had ‘no “reasonable expectation of privacy”’ in 
his whereabouts on the public roads—a proposition with at least as much support in our case 
law as the one the State marshals here.”) (citations omitted)); id. at 17 (Alito, J., dissenting) 
(“The Court’s decision is also inconsistent with the reasonable-expectations-of-privacy test 
that the Court adopted in Katz . . . . A reasonable person understands that odors emanating 
from a house may be detected from locations that are open to the public, and a reasonable 
person will not count on the strength of those odors remaining within the range that, while 
detectible by a dog, cannot be smelled by a human. For these reasons, I would hold that no 
search within the meaning of the Fourth Amendment took place in this case, and I would 
reverse the decision below.”). 
 246. See id. at 3–4, 11–12 (holding that law enforcement officers’ use of drug-sniffing 
dog on front porch of home to investigate an unverified tip that marijuana was being grown 
in the home was a trespassory invasion of the curtilage which constituted a “search” for 
Fourth Amendment purposes). 
 247. Id. at 12 (Kagan, J., concurring) (“A stranger comes to the front door of your home 
carrying super-high-powered binoculars. He doesn’t knock or say hello. Instead, he stands 
on the porch and uses the binoculars to peer through your windows, into your home’s 
furthest corners. It doesn’t take long (the binoculars are really very fine): In just a couple of 
minutes, his uncommon behavior allows him to learn details of your life you disclose to no 
one. Has your ‘visitor’ trespassed on your property, exceeding the license you have granted 
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Perhaps not surprisingly, all these cases, except Carpenter, involved 
drugs. Obviously, technology poses difficult challenges for the Court. 
However, they can be read more broadly than simply rethinking the Court’s 
technology approach. The decisions seem to demonstrate a willingness to 
reevaluate the Court’s War on Drugs Fourth Amendment case law and a 
willingness to reinvigorate Fourth Amendment protection.  
Constitutional history does not move in one direction. One can find 
examples in the past when the Court’s Fourth Amendment case law has 
waxed and waned.
248
 Often, such movement correlates with changing 
public attitudes.
249
 At times, historical trends have led to liberalized 
rulings.
250
 Almost certainly, the Warren Court justices were acutely aware 
of the Nazi and Soviet experiences where police routinely violated human 
rights.
251
 Such concerns influenced the Court towards expanding basic 
protections.
252
 Of course, public opinion works in the opposite direction as 
well. For example, the public perception that the Warren Court’s liberal 
rulings increased crime helped lead to Richard Nixon’s victory in 1968,
253
 
and his addition of four new Justices in two years helped erode many of 
those protections.
254
 Similarly, public panic about drugs in the 1980s led to 
diminished Fourth Amendment protection for criminal defendants.
255
 We 
are now at another crossroads. 
                                                                                                                 
to members of the public to, say, drop off the mail or distribute campaign flyers? Yes, he 
has. And has he also invaded your ‘reasonable expectation of privacy,’ by nosing into 
intimacies you sensibly thought protected from disclosure? Yes, of course, he has done that 
too.”) (citations omitted)). 
 248. See Carol S. Steiker, Second Thoughts About First Principles, 107 HARV. L. REV. 
820, 841–44 (1994) (discussing shifting attitudes about Fourth Amendment rights). 
 249. See id. at 843 (discussing connection between civil rights movement and Fourth 
Amendment case law). 
 250. See id. 
 251. See, e.g., Wolf v. Colorado, 338 U.S. 25, 27 (1949) (reasoning that due process 
encompasses an evolving set of fundamental rights that changes with the advancing 
standards of a free society but that nevertheless there is no question that the right to privacy 
and freedom from its arbitrary invasion by federal or state police is fundamental). For a 
discussion of how the public revelation of the Nazi atrocities influenced the Supreme Court, 
see Steiker, supra note 248, at 842–43 (discussing Nuremberg’s influence on Fourth 
Amendment jurisprudence).  
 252. See Steiker, supra note 248, at 843–44. 
 253. See BAKER, supra note 58, at 243–49. 
 254. See Michael Vitiello, The Warren Court’s Eyewitness Identification Case Law: 
What If?, 51 U. PAC. L. REV. 867, 874–75 (2020). 
 255. See id. at 868–69. 
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Below, this Article discusses some issues that have arisen in states where 
medical and/or recreational marijuana are lawful.
256
 As developed there, I 
see a willingness to expand Fourth Amendment protection.
257
 However, a 
few state courts are reexamining earlier precedent.
258
 Does this begin a new 
era in which courts will reclaim Fourth Amendment protections? As 
developed below, I believe so.
259
 
IV. Legalized Marijuana and Probable Cause, 
Drug-Sniffing Dogs, and Helicopters 
A. Legal Marijuana and Probable Cause  
Assume that a person lives in a state that has legalized the medical and/or 
recreational use of marijuana. Assume further that an officer encounters 
that individual and observes the person using marijuana. Does the officer 
have probable cause to arrest the individual or to search the person’s 
immediate area?  
One scholar has summarized the law generally without reference to 
legalization: 
[A]t least at the Supreme Court level, marijuana has played a 
central role in cases where probable cause or reasonable 
suspicion was based at least in part on an officer’s “plain smell.” 
And lower court cases show that officers continue to find it easy 
to detect the presence of marijuana while engaged in other 
lawful investigative enterprises. Police in search-and-seizure 
cases claim to have smelled burned or burning marijuana, 




Should the same rules apply post-legalization? 
Early case law said yes, almost universally. People v. Strasburg, decided 
by a middle appellate court in California, is a typical example of this 
application.
261
 The facts in the case are convoluted. The essential facts, 
                                                                                                                 
 256. See infra Part IV. 
 257. See infra Part IV. 
 258. See infra Part IV. 
 259. See infra Part IV. 
 260. Mandiberg, supra note 1, at 39–41. 
 261. 56 Cal. Rptr. 3d 306, 308 (Ct. App. 2007) (holding that defendant’s prescription for 
medical marijuana did not deprive officer of a basis to detain or frisk defendant). 
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however, are as follows: a Napa police officer approached a car in which 
Strasburg and another person were sitting.
262
 As he did so, the defendant 
opened his car door.
263
 The officer smelled marijuana.
264
 The defendant 
admitted that he possessed cannabis but tried to show the officer his 
medical marijuana authorization card.
265




The encounter between the officer and the defendant escalated,
267
 as such 
incidents often do. The officer ended up ordering the defendant out of the 
car.
268
 An ensuing search resulted in the discovery of twenty-three ounces 
of marijuana and a scale.
269
 The appellate court, upholding the police 
conduct, agreed with the trial court’s finding that “once an officer smells 
marijuana coming from a car that officer can search the car for 
marijuana.”
270
 The defendant did not present “any authority that possessing 
a medical marijuana card deprives the officer of the right to continue with 
that investigation.”
271
 Rephrased, the officer had probable cause to believe 
that the suspect, even with a marijuana card, was violating state law.  
Such a ruling was consistent with cases in other states.
272
 
The Supreme Court of Arizona, for example, emphasized the 
fact that its medical marijuana law “did not decriminalize the 
possession or use of marijuana generally” and instead “makes 
marijuana legal in only limited circumstances.” In reaching the 
same conclusion, the Michigan Court of Appeals noted that its 
state’s medical marijuana law was a “very limited, highly 
restricted exception to the statutory proscription against the 
manufacture and use of marijuana in Michigan.” . . . . 
                                                                                                                 
 262. Id. at 307. 
 263. Id. 
 264. Id. 
 265. Id. at 307–08. 
 266. Id. at 308. 
 267. See id. 
 268. Id. 
 269. Id. 
 270. Id. 
 271. Id. 
 272. See Alex Kreit, Marijuana Legalization and Pretextual Stops, 50 U.C. DAVIS L. 
REV. 741, 761–62 (2016) (explaining that states with medical marijuana statutes, such as 
Arizona, Michigan, and New Jersey, have all held that possession of illegal marijuana can 
still be probable cause for a search). 
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 . . . The Vermont Supreme Court . . . found the odds that the 
“odor of fresh marijuana” may be coming from legally possessed 
medical marijuana to be a “small possibility,” insufficient to 
“negate the State’s probable cause to search . . . .”
273
 
The Supreme Court’s rather low bar for probable cause could be 
interpreted to support the results reached in California, Arizona, and 
Michigan. The Court has found that “innocent behavior frequently will 
. . . provide the basis for probable cause.”
274
 The Fourth Amendment’s 
probable cause standard “requires only a probability or substantial chance 
of criminal activity, not an actual showing of such activity.”
275
 Even if the 
Supreme Court demanded stronger support for a probable cause finding, it 
would still be likely that—especially in the early days of medical 
marijuana—most marijuana users were not medical marijuana users.
276
 
Hence, as a matter of probabilities, an officer observing someone smoking 
marijuana would likely be correct in believing that the marijuana user was 
violating state law. 
For many years, Massachusetts was an outlier. Because possession of 
one ounce or less of marijuana was merely a civil offense after 2008, the 
state’s highest court held that an officer could not even formulate 
reasonable suspicion when he observed a suspect in possession of 
marijuana.
277
 Unlike the California appellate court’s approach, the 
Massachusetts court found that the odor of burnt marijuana did not create 
                                                                                                                 
 273. Id. (footnotes omitted) (first quoting State v. Sisco, 373 P.3d 549, 553 (Ariz. 2016); 
then quoting People v. Brown, 825 N.W.2d 91, 94 (Mich. Ct. App. 2012); and then quoting 
State v. Senna, 79 A.3d 45, 50 (Vt. 2013)). 
 274. Illinois v. Gates, 462 U.S. 213, 243 n.13 (1983) (emphasis added).  
 275. Kreit, supra note 272, at 760–61 (quoting Illinois v. Gates, 462 U.S. 213, 243 n.13 
(1983)). 
 276. Although the numbers may vary from state to state, recent empirical evidence 
supports this assumption. See, e.g., Rosalie Liccardo Pacula, Mireille Jacobson & Ervant J. 
Maksabedian, In the Weeds: A Baseline View of Cannabis Use Among Legalizing States and 
Their Neighbours, 111 ADDICTION 973, 975 (2016) (surveying marijuana use patterns in 
Colorado, Washington, Oregon, and New Mexico and finding that recreational marijuana 
use is higher than medical marijuana use in all four states).  
 277. See Commonwealth v. Cruz, 945 N.E.2d 899, 905 (Mass. 2011) (holding that in 
light of statute decriminalizing possession of less than one ounce of marijuana, the odor of 
burnt marijuana that police officers detected from validly stopped vehicle did not, when 
combined with other factors, give rise to a reasonable suspicion that defendant, a passenger 
in that car, was engaged in criminal activity so as to justify an order to defendant to exit 
vehicle). 
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justification to search a vehicle.
278
 The state’s initiative made an ounce or 
less a civil violation, not a crime. As a result, merely smelling marijuana 




Does anything change with the legalization of recreational marijuana? 
Recently, a California District Court of Appeal said yes.
280
 In People v. Lee, 
which involved a complex fact pattern, two officers approached a parked 
car and observed the defendant and another person in the vehicle.
281
 The 
officers learned that the defendant had marijuana on his person, and the 
defendant indicated that he delivered medical marijuana.
282
 The officers 
also learned that the defendant was driving with a suspended license.
283
 The 
officers told the defendant that the police were going to impound his car.
284
 
They continued to look inside the vehicle, eventually finding a handgun, 
fifty-six grams of cocaine and other evidence.
285
 Charged with possession 
not of cocaine for personal use while armed, the defendant successfully 
moved to suppress the evidence.
286
 
The state argued, inter alia, that finding the defendant in possession of 
marijuana justified the search of the vehicle.
287
 Unlike the Strasburg court, 
which found that a medical marijuana card alone did not negate the 
reasonableness of a search, the Lee court, in effect, rejected a bright-line 
rule.
288
 Possession of marijuana alone did not create probable cause for a 
continued search.
289
 As summarized by the court:  
[T]here must be evidence—that is, additional evidence beyond 
the mere possession of a legal amount—that would cause a 
reasonable person to believe the defendant has more marijuana. 
And it would be incorrect to say that California’s legalization of 
                                                                                                                 
 278. Id. at 908. 
 279. Id. at 913. 
 280. People v. Lee, 253 Cal. Rptr. 3d 512, 521–22 (Ct. App. 2019) (explaining that the 
legalization of marijuana affects the court’s analysis of whether there was probable cause to 
search defendant’s vehicle). 
 281. Id. at 516–17. 
 282. Id. 
 283. Id. 
 284. Id.  
 285. Id. at 517. 
 286. Id. at 517–18. 
 287. Id. at 519–20. 
 288. See id. 
 289. Id. 
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marijuana is of no relevance in assessing whether there is 
probable cause to search a vehicle in which police find a small 
and legal amount of the drug. To understand the significance of 
California’s legalization of marijuana to the suppression motion 
here, we must construe the relevant cases in their historical 
context.
290 
Consistent with Lee, an officer’s knowledge that a suspect has marijuana 




To date, only one court has cited Lee.
292
 While it did so largely in 
agreement with the court’s holding,
293
 one can no doubt imagine 
counterarguments.
294
 Prosecutors in California (and elsewhere, if other 
recreational marijuana states arrive at the same conclusion as does Lee) 
may challenge the court’s Fourth Amendment analysis. For the first time in 
decades, Democratic appointees are now a majority on the state’s highest 
court.
295
 Although it is a bit of an oversimplification, a more liberal 
                                                                                                                 
 290. Id. 
 291. Id.  
 292. See United States v. Maffei, 417 F. Supp. 3d 1212, 1225 (N.D. Cal. 2019). 
 293. See id. at 1220, 1221–22, 1226–27, 1232–33 (holding that: (1) defendant was seized 
under the Fourth Amendment from the time of officer’s traffic stop of vehicle that she was a 
passenger of through the duration of the stop; (2) officer’s request for license of defendant, 
who was the passenger in vehicle, did not materially prolong the stop; (3) officer 
unreasonably prolonged the otherwise reasonable seizure of the vehicle by conducting a 
record check of defendant; (4) officer did not have probable cause to believe that vehicle 
contained contraband to support a search under the automobile exception to the warrant 
requirement; (5) broken taillight on vehicle did not justify the impoundment of the vehicle 
under the community caretaking exception to the warrant requirement; (6) search warrant for 
defendant’s home was not supported by probable cause, and therefore valid warrant 
exception to the exclusionary rule did not apply to evidence found during the search; and (7) 
constitutional error regarding search was made by the officer of the case rather than the 
magistrate, and therefore good faith exception to the exclusionary rule did not apply). 
 294. For example, it is very likely that a Californian in possession of marijuana is still in 
violation of the law. More than two years after the rollout of Proposition 64, which legalized 
marijuana, the best estimate is that spending on illicit marijuana is almost three times as high 
as that on legal marijuana. ARCVIEW MKT. RES. & BDS ANALYTICS, CALIFORNIA: LESSONS 
FROM THE WORLD’S LARGEST CANNABIS MARKET: EXECUTIVE SUMMARY 6 (2019), 
https://bdsa.com/wp-content/uploads/2019/08/2019_BDS_California_CIB_Exec_Summ_ 
Final_With_A.pdf. 
 295. Justices, CAL. CTS., https://www.courts.ca.gov/3014.htm (last visited Sept. 17, 
2020) (listing the current makeup of the California Supreme Court). 
https://digitalcommons.law.ou.edu/olr/vol73/iss2/4
2021]    THE RENEWED FOURTH AMENDMENT? 327 
 
 
California Supreme Court may follow suit in strengthening Fourth 
Amendment protection surrounding marijuana possession.
296
  
Would the United States Supreme Court follow suit as well? The Court 
typically waits for lower courts to weigh in on legal issues.
297
 Especially 
considering the cases that I discuss below,
298
 state courts may be ready for a 
more expansive Fourth Amendment as well. A consensus among lower 
courts might influence the Supreme Court. In addition, as I argued above, 
the Supreme Court has signaled a willingness to rethink its War on Drugs 
Fourth Amendment case law.
299
  
B. Drug-Sniffing Dogs 
As discussed above, early in the War on Drugs, the Court handed police 
a powerful tool when it held that exposing personal items to a drug-sniffing 
dog was not a search.
300
 The Court extended that holding in Illinois v. 
Caballes.
301
 There, the Court found that Place’s dicta applied when an 
officer exposed a person’s vehicle to a drug-sniffing dog.
302
  
In Place, in dicta, the Court indicated that the dog-sniff was not a search 
because it revealed only the presence or absence of contraband.
303
 Under 
the Katz formulation defining a “search,” a person has no reasonable 
expectation of privacy in the possession of contraband.
304
 
                                                                                                                 
 296. See generally GABRIEL WEINBERGER, THE CRIMINAL JUSTICE SYSTEM AND MORE 
LENIENT DRUG POLICY (2019) (identifying various sentencing reforms and more liberal drug 
policies supported largely by Democrats, often with little or no support from Republicans). 
 297. Deena Shanker, The U.S. Supreme Court Decides Less Than Half as Many Cases as 
It Did 40 Years Ago—and That’s Just Fine, QUARTZ (July 5, 2015), https://qz.com/ 
443100/supreme-court-decisions/ (“[T]he justices are waiting for critical masses of lower 
courts to rule on [issues] before weighing in.”).  
 298. See infra Sections IV.C.–D. 
 299. See supra Parts II–III. 
 300. See supra Section II.C. 
 301. 543 U.S. 405, 406, 409–10 (2005) (holding that where lawful traffic stop was not 
extended beyond time necessary to issue warning ticket and to conduct ordinary inquiries 
incident to such a stop, another officer’s arrival at scene while stop was in progress and use 
of narcotics-detection dog to sniff around exterior of motorist’s vehicle did not rise to level 
of cognizable infringement on motorist’s Fourth Amendment rights). 
 302. Id. at 409. 
 303. See United States v. Place, 462 U.S. 696, 707 (1983) (holding that exposure of 
luggage to a trained narcotics detection dog is not a search for Fourth Amendment 
purposes). 
 304. See Caballes, 543 U.S. at 408–09 (reasoning under the Katz formulation of privacy 
that “possessing contraband cannot be deemed ‘legitimate,’ and thus, governmental conduct 
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Many, including some members of the Court, have questioned this 
conclusion.
305
 Importantly, the Court seemed to believe erroneously in the 
infallibility of drug-sniffing dogs.
306
 Data emerged suggesting frequent 
false positives.
307
 The dog-sniff allows a search of one’s personal 
possessions. When the dog is wrong, the police have been able to examine 




                                                                                                                 
that only reveals the possession of contraband ‘compromises no legitimate privacy interest.’ 
This is because the expectation ‘that certain facts will not come to the attention of the 
authorities’ is not the same as an interest in ‘privacy that society is prepared to consider 
reasonable.’”) (citations omitted). 
 305. See, e.g., id. at 411–12 (Souter, J., dissenting) (“The infallible dog, however, is a 
creature of legal fiction. Although the Supreme Court of Illinois did not get into the sniffing 
averages of drug dogs, their supposed infallibility is belied by judicial opinions describing 
well-trained animals sniffing and alerting with less than perfect accuracy, whether owing to 
errors by their handlers, the limitations of the dogs themselves, or even the pervasive 
contamination of currency by cocaine. . . . Indeed, a study cited by Illinois in this case for 
the proposition that dog sniffs are ‘generally reliable’ shows that dogs in artificial testing 
situations return false positives anywhere from 12.5% to 60% of the time, depending on the 
length of the search.” (citing Reply Brief for Petitioner at 13, Caballes, 543 U.S. 405 (2005) 
(No. 03-923))); KELLY J. GARNER ET AL., FED. AVIATION ADMIN., DUTY CYCLE OF THE 
DETECTOR DOG: A BASELINE STUDY 12 (Apr. 2001) (prepared by Auburn University 
Institute for Biological Detection Systems). “In practical terms, the evidence is clear that the 
dog that alerts hundreds of times will be wrong dozens of times.” Id. at 412; see also United 
States v. Bentley, 795 F.3d 630, 635 (5th Cir. 2015) (“[A]n alert from an adequately trained 
and reliable drug detection dog is sufficient to give rise to a finding of probable cause.”); 
Harris v. State, 71 So. 3d 756, 767 (Fla. 2011) (holding that fact that drug-detection dog has 
been trained and certified to detect narcotics, standing alone, is not sufficient to demonstrate 
reliability of dog for purposes of determining probable cause for search), withdrawn, 123 So. 
3d 1144, 1144 (Fla. 2013) (per curiam); United States v. Florez, 871 F. Supp. 1411, 1424 
(D.N.M. 1994) (holding that an alert by a trained narcotics dog provides probable cause only 
if reliability of dog is shown and that in the absence of records concerning dog’s alerts, 
dog’s alert is insufficient to establish probable cause). 
 306. See, e.g., Caballes, 543 U.S. at 411–12 (Souter, J., dissenting). 
 307. See id. at 412 (citing Reply Brief for Petitioner at 13, Caballes, 543 U.S. 405 (2005) 
(No. 03-923)); GARNER ET AL., supra note 305, at 12; see also Bentley, 795 F.3d at 635 
(noting that the drug-sniffing dog’s field accuracy “is not much better than a coin flip”).  
 308. Assume, as is often the case considering data cited above, that a drug-sniffing dog 
gives a false positive. That creates probable cause, allowing police to search a person’s 
possessions. One can easily imagine personal items, lawful to possess, that a person might 
not want to reveal to the police or to anyone else for that matter. 
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Early commentators also rarely discussed the causes for poor 
performance by drug-sniffing dogs.
309
 Training varies widely.
310
 A common 
practice is for a trainer to reward the dog only upon signaling the presence 
of drugs,
311
 which may encourage drug-sniffing dogs to signal the presence 
of drugs in close cases. Further, dog handlers seldom train dogs to signal 
only significant amounts of drugs (any amount is sufficient).
312
 The reality, 
then, is that the police may develop probable cause to search or to arrest an 
lyindividual based on a bad “tip” by a poor  trained K-9 animal, or the 
animal could detect a legal amount of marijuana that should not give rise to 
probable cause in states where marijuana is legal in certain amounts.
313
 
Because a dog-sniff is not Fourth Amendment activity, police need no 
threshold showing of any kind to expose the person’s personal items to a 




Not surprisingly, some lower courts have attempted to impose additional 
requirements to limit the use of drug-sniffing dogs.
315
 A unanimous 
Supreme Court rejected Florida’s highest court’s efforts to impose a multi-
factored test when police relied on a drug-sniffing dog’s signal.
316
 The 
                                                                                                                 
 309. See GARNER ET AL., supra note 305, at 12 (showing false-positive rates based on 
length of search). 
 310. For examples of various K-9 dog training programs, see generally RESI GERRISTEN 
& RUUD HAAK, K9 PROFESSIONAL TRACKING: A COMPLETE MANUAL FOR THEORY AND 
TRAINING (2001); K9TS Training Solutions, K9TS, https://www.k9ts.org/ (last visited Sept. 
17, 2020); K9 TRAINING: DOG TRAINING PROFS., http://k9training.us/ (last visited Sept. 17, 
2020); K-9 Program, CAL. DEP’T FISH & WILDLIFE, https://wildlife.ca.gov/ 
Enforcement/K9 (last visited Sept. 17, 2020). 
 311. See, e.g., GARNER ET AL., supra note 305, at 6 (explaining that dogs in the study 
were rewarded for correct alerts). 
 312. See id. at 3–4 (evaluating ability to detect odor without consideration to quantity of 
odorous substance). 
 313. See infra notes 326–31. 
 314. See Illinois v. Caballes, 543 U.S. 405, 410 (2005) (Souter, J., dissenting) (explaining 
that the Court has held that “the sniff of the narcotics-seeking dog [is] ‘sui generis’ under the 
Fourth Amendment and . . . [is] not a search”). 
 315. See, e.g., Harris v. State, 71 So. 3d 756, 767 (Fla. 2011) (holding that the fact that a 
drug-detection dog has been trained and certified to detect narcotics, standing alone, is not 
sufficient to demonstrate the reliability of the dog for purposes of determining probable 
cause for a search). 
 316. Florida v. Harris, 568 U.S. 237, 240, 248 (2013) (holding that Florida Supreme 
Court did not apply “‘flexible, common-sense standard’ of probable cause” in determining 
reliability of drug detection dog, and that the dog’s reliability was established (quoting 
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may beSupreme Court indicated that a dog’s past performance  a relevant 




The Colorado Supreme Court’s 2019 decision in People v. McKnight, 
however, suggests that some courts are ready to cut back on the Supreme 
Court’s doctrine.
318
 In McKnight, a police officer stopped the defendant’s 
truck for a traffic violation.
319
 During the stop, the officer requested a K-9 
unit.
320
 The drug-sniffing dog signaled the presence of one of the 
substances he had been trained to identify in the defendant’s truck.
321
 
Subsequently, police searched the defendant’s vehicle and discovered a 
residue-encrusted methamphetamine pipe.
322
 Thereafter, the defendant was 
arrested.
323
 Important to the court’s decision was the fact that the dog was 
trained to signal the presence of methamphetamines, cocaine, heroin, 




The court framed the issue with precision: 
[T]he possession of an ounce or less of marijuana by someone 
twenty-one or older is legal in Colorado, following the passage 
of Amendment 64, Colo. Const. art. XVIII, § 16(3), even though 
such possession remains illegal under federal law. Thus, no 
matter how reliable his nose, Kilo [the drug-sniffing dog] can 
now render a kind of false positive for marijuana. He has been 
trained to alert to marijuana based on the notion that marijuana is 
always contraband, when that is no longer true under state law. 
And historically, whether a drug-detection dog might alert on 
                                                                                                                 
Illinois v. Gates, 462 U.S. 213, 239 (1983))); see id. at 248 (rejecting Florida’s totality test, 
which largely focused on the dog’s past performance in the field). 
 317. See id. at 245 (“[T]he decision below treats records of a dog’s field performance as 
the gold standard in evidence, when in most cases they have relatively limited import.”). 
 318. 446 P.3d 397, 410, 413 (Colo. 2019) (holding that: (1) a sniff from a dog trained to 
detect marijuana is a “search” under the State Constitution and “must be justified by some 
degree of suspicion of criminal activity”; (2) a warrantless sniff of automobile by dog trained 
to detect marijuana was not justified; and (3) “exclusion is the appropriate remedy for this 
type of constitutional violation”). 
 319. Id. at 400. 
 320. Id. 
 321. Id. 
 322. Id. 
 323. See id.  
 324. Id. at 406. 
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noncontraband drives whether the dog’s sniff constitutes a 
search implicating constitutional protections. The dog’s sniff 
arguably intrudes on a person’s reasonable expectation of 
privacy in lawful activity. If so, that intrusion must be justified 




Application of Supreme Court precedent would have ended the 
discussion quickly: a dog-sniff is not a search because it reveals only the 
presence or absence of contraband.
326
 Exposure of the vehicle was 
constitutional if the dog-sniff occurred within the time needed to process a 
ticket for the traffic offense.
327
 Instead, the Colorado Supreme Court relied 
on its state constitutional provision to find for the defendant.
328
  
When the Supreme Court decided United States v. Place, a dog—assuming 
reliability—revealed only illegal activity.
329
 An offender could not have a 
reasonable expectation of privacy in contraband.
330
 Not so in Colorado any 
longer: the dog’s alert could signal activity entirely legal under state law.
331
 
, however,A court  could arrive at the opposite conclusion. In McKnight, 
the court could have instead adopted the state’s argument: all use of 
marijuana violates federal law.
332
 Hence, one cannot have a reasonable 
expectation of privacy in any amount of marijuana—even if it is legal under 
state law—because all marijuana is contraband federally. The Colorado 
                                                                                                                 
 325. Id. 
 326. Id. at 405; see also United States v. Place, 462 U.S. 696, 707 (1983) (determining 
that a dog sniff is not a search under the Fourth Amendment because it reveals limited 
information, namely, “only the presence or absence of narcotics, a contraband item”). 
 327. McKnight, 446 P.3d at 405. 
 328. Id. at 399. 
 329. See Place, 462 U.S. at 707 (explaining that a dog sniff “does not expose 
noncontraband items”). 
 330. Id. 
 331. McKnight, 446 P.3d at 399 (noting that while the dog sniff would have been 
constitutional had the sniff only detected the presence or absence of contraband, the dog in 
this case was “trained to alert to marijuana based on the notion that marijuana is always 
contraband, when that is no longer true under state law. And historically, whether a drug-
detection dog might alert on noncontraband drives whether the dog’s sniff constitutes a 
search implicating constitutional protections. The dog’s sniff arguably intrudes on a person’s 
reasonable expectation of privacy in lawful activity. If so, that intrusion must be justified by 
some degree of particularized suspicion of criminal activity.”). 
 332. Id. at 406 (acknowledging that because marijuana remains contraband under federal 
law, the dog’s sniff is arguably not a search under the U.S. Supreme Court’s Caballes 
decision). 
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court’s rejection of the state’s argument, however, demonstrates a new 
attitude in the post-War on Drugs era.
333
 Further, it advances significant 
privacy interests. Even today, when most Americans live in states where 
some form of marijuana is legal,
334
 police still make thousands of 
marijuana-related arrests.
335
 A marijuana arrest may lead to a conviction 
with any number of consequences. Such arrests are disruptive even if they 
do not lead to criminal convictions or to jail time.
336
 They can lead to lost 
time at work, with the possible loss of a job.
337
 Even a civil marijuana 
violation—not a misdemeanor—may incur fines and fees, leading some 
offenders to borrow those funds from a high-interest lender.
338
 As many 
Americans learned in the aftermath of the Michael Brown shooting, 
numerous municipalities fund their budgets in large part with fines and fees 
imposed on their poorer communities.
339




Consistent with the theme of this Article, McKnight provides more 
evidence that courts are reclaiming Fourth Amendment protection. 
However, because the McKnight court relied on the state constitution, the 
state cannot seek review in the Supreme Court.
341
 As part of a larger 
mosaic, McKnight may signal to the Supreme Court an emerging consensus 
in favor of more vigorous Fourth Amendment protection at least in 
marijuana cases. 
                                                                                                                 
 333. See id. at 410 (“Because a sniff from a dog trained to detect marijuana (in addition 
to other substances) can reveal lawful activity, . . . that sniff is a search under article II, 
section 7 and must be justified by some degree of suspicion of criminal activity.”). 
 334. See Sarah Rense, Here Are All the States That Have Legalized Weed in the U.S., 
ESQUIRE (Feb. 7, 2020), https://www.esquire.com/lifestyle/a21719186/all-states-that-
legalized-weed-in-us/. 
 335. See Vitiello, supra note 13, at 808 (observing that marijuana-related arrests of black 
and Latino youths have increased). 
 336. Id. at 806–07. 
 337. Id. 
 338. See id. 
 339. See Walter Johnson, Ferguson’s Fortune 500 Company: Why the Missouri City—
Despite Hosting a Multinational Corporation—Relied on Municipal Fees and Fines to 
Extract Revenue from Its Poorest Residents, ATLANTIC (Apr. 26, 2015), https://www. 
theatlantic.com/politics/archive/2015/04/fergusons-fortune-500-company/390492/. 
 340. Insofar as the state still has a legitimate interest in pursuing other kinds of drug 
offenders, the police can find dogs trained to signal for drugs other than marijuana. See 
People v. McKnight, 446 P.3d 397, 399 (Colo. 2019). 
 341. See id. at 410. 
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C. Overflights and Helicopters 
As developed above, during the height of the War on Drugs, the 
not Supreme Court held that overflights did amount to Fourth Amendment 
searches.
342
 It did so in cases where defendants grew marijuana within the 
curtilage of their homes and made significant efforts to keep their activities 
private.
343
 In Florida v. Riley, the Court was willing to ignore a 
homeowner’s extraordinary efforts to keep his activities private.
344
 Five 




Helicopter overflights are no small intrusion as described in cases where 
police have observed marijuana growing near defendants’ homes. For 
example, in State v. Davis, the defendant was in bed and not well when a 
helicopter began hovering right above his home.
346
 When he went outside, 
“[h]e observed the helicopter hovering approximately 50 feet above his 
head ‘kicking up dust and debris that was swirling all around.’”
347
 
Other witnesses testified to even more disruption: 
Several nearby residents characterized the helicopter flyovers 
during Operation Yerba Buena as terrifying and highly 
disruptive. Kelly Rayburn watched a helicopter fly around his 
house about “half a dozen times.” Rayburn said the helicopter 
flew so close to his roof that the downdraft lifted off a solar 
panel and scattered trash all over his property. Victoria Lindsay 
observed a helicopter sweeping back and forth over her property, 
sending debris and personal property all over the yard. Lindsay 
also observed the helicopter hovering very close to the ground at 
a neighbor’s greenhouse. Merilee Lighty observed a helicopter 
                                                                                                                 
 342. See supra Section II.C.2. 
 343. See California v. Ciraolo, 476 U.S. 207, 209 (1986) (describing “a 6-foot outer 
fence and a 10-foot inner fence completely enclosing the yard”); see also Florida v. Riley, 
488 U.S. 445, 448 (1989) (describing a greenhouse with two of its sides enclosed, 
surrounded by trees and shrubs, and covered with roofing panels). 
 344. See Riley, 488 U.S. at 451–52 (holding that an officer’s observation, with his naked 
eye, of interior of partially covered greenhouse in residential backyard from vantage point of 
helicopter circling 400 feet above did not constitute a “search” for which a warrant was 
required, despite defendant’s efforts to keep his activities private). 
 345. Id. at 446. 
 346. 360 P.3d 1161, 1164 (N.M. 2015). 
 347. Id. 
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flying over her property for about 15 minutes. She said it was so 
close that the downdraft affected her trees and her bushes.
348
 
Given the narrow majority in the Court’s overflight case law and a 
reconsideration of the War on Drugs era cases, litigants have begun to 
challenge the Court’s rulings.
349
 Davis provides a good example of how at 
least one state court has dealt with the problem. There, the defendant 
challenged the overflight as a search within the meaning of both New 
Mexico’s Constitution and the United States Constitution.
350
 The court of 
appeals found that the overflight did not constitute a Fourth Amendment 
search, but did amount to a violation of the state constitution.
351
 The New 
Mexico Supreme Court disagreed: it found that the police conduct was both 




 The Davis court started with the premise that a person may have a 
reasonable expectation of privacy in the curtilage of one’s home.
353
 
Whether in fact an owner has such an expectation depends on his efforts to 
exclude others from viewing activity within the curtilage.
354
 The court 
found that the defendant had made such efforts, for example, by fencing the 
area around his home.
355
 However, fencing alone is not enough to create a 
justifiable expectation of privacy if the police gain their aerial observation 
in a manner that is not overly intrusive.
356
 Here, the court focused closely 
on statements in Justice White’s plurality opinion in Riley.
357
 As the New 
Mexico Supreme Court read Riley, the police cross the threshold from 
observation to search with “a physical disturbance on the ground or 
unreasonable interference with a resident’s use of his property.”
358
 Once an 
                                                                                                                 
 348. Id. 
 349. See id. at 1172 (agreeing with Davis that “aerial surveillance over [his] property was 
an unwarranted search in violation of the Fourth Amendment”). 
 350. Id. at 1166. 
 351. Id. 
 352. See id. at 1166, 1172 (reasoning that under the “interstitial approach” to 
constitutional interpretation where federal and state constitutions provide overlapping 
protections, the court first considers whether the right being asserted is protected under the 
federal constitution, and if it is, then the state constitution claim is not reached). 
 353. Id. at 1167. 
 354. Id. 
 355. Id. 
 356. See id. at 1167–68 (citing California v. Ciraolo, 476 U.S. 207, 213 (1986)). 
 357. See id. at 1168–69.  
 358. Id. at 1169. 
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officer crosses that line, “surveillance more closely resembles a physical 




Intriguingly, the New Mexico court also cited Justice Sotomayor’s 
concurring opinion in United States v. Jones.
360
 There, the Court found that 
federal agents committed a trespass when they attached a GPS device to 
Jones’s vehicle, which constituted a Fourth Amendment search.
361
 The 
Davis court also canvassed lower court cases that have dealt with the same 




Ultimately, the Davis Court found that the police conduct did amount to 
a search.
363
 In theory, the court’s decision lines up with the Supreme 
Court’s case law.
364
 Generally, overflights are not searches but can cross the 
line based on a case-by-case analysis.
365
 Davis is consistent with the overall 
thesis of this Article: courts recognize the failure of the War on Drugs and 
                                                                                                                 
 359. Id. (citations omitted). 
 360. Id. (quoting United States v. Jones, 565 U.S. 400, 413 (2012) (Sotomayor, J., 
concurring) (“[A] search within the meaning of the Fourth Amendment occurs, at a 
minimum, ‘[w]here . . . the Government obtains information by physically intruding on a 
constitutionally protected area.’”) (citation omitted)). 
 361. See Jones, 565 U.S. at 404 (incorporating the property-based trespass test articulated 
in earlier cases and holding that the warrantless placement of a GPS tracking device on the 
undercarriage of an individual’s vehicle in order to track the person’s movements on public 
streets constitutes an unlawful search in violation of the Fourth Amendment because a 
vehicle is an “effect” within the meaning of the Fourth Amendment). 
 362. See Davis, 360 P.3d at 1169 (“We do not consider this question in a vacuum. Many 
state courts base their determination of whether a particular aerial surveillance violates the 
Fourth Amendment on the degree of physical intrusion on the ground below. In assessing 
intrusion, courts look at the legality of the flight, the altitude of the aircraft, the frequency 
and duration of the flight, and the nature of the area observed—factors similar to Ciraolo 
and Riley and factors employed by the district court in this very case.”). See generally id. at 
1169–71 (discussing lower court cases dealing with the issue). 
 363. Id. at 1172 (“Based on the evidence, therefore, we conclude that the official conduct 
in this case went beyond a brief flyover to gather information. The prolonged hovering close 
enough to the ground to cause interference with Davis’ property transformed this 
surveillance from a lawful observation of an area left open to public view to an 
unconstitutional intrusion into Davis’ expectation of privacy. We think what happened in 
this case to Davis and other persons on the ground is precisely what did not occur in either 
Ciraolo or Riley . . . . Accordingly, we hold that the aerial surveillance over Davis’ property 
was an unwarranted search in violation of the Fourth Amendment.”). 
 364. See id. (distinguishing Ciraolo and Riley from Davis). 
 365. Id. at 1169. 
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the erosion of the Fourth Amendment. They are breathing new life into the 
Fourth Amendment or analogous state laws. The opinion demonstrates 
more concern about expectations of privacy and less concern about aiding 
police in the War on Drugs.
366
 Further, the court grounded its decision on 
the Fourth Amendment instead of the safe harbor of the state 
constitution.
367
 Doing so left open the possibility that the state could have 
petitioned the Supreme Court for review.
368
 An increase in cases that 
challenge specific facts may lead to the Supreme Court reexamining its case 
law.  
V. Concluding Thoughts 
As argued above, the War on Drugs has diminished Fourth Amendment 
protection. Today, Americans across a broad political spectrum seem 
exhausted with the war. Perhaps not coincidentally, the Supreme Court 
seems willing to rethink some of its Fourth Amendment case law.
369
 Here, I 
have argued that pressure from lower courts may advance that trend.
370
  
Especially in states where voters and legislatures have legalized 
marijuana for medical or recreational use, courts seem ready to cut back on 
police power.
371
 The Court’s watered-down Fourth Amendment case law 
has allowed police too much power to invade individuals’ privacy interests. 
While the Supreme Court sometimes rejects widely adopted views from 
lower courts, it often defers to the lower courts.
372
 Given that the Court 
already seems open to rethinking its Fourth Amendment case law, 
continued upward pressure from lower courts can help us reclaim our 
  constitutional protections.
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